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Abstract
Scientific workflow systems increasingly store provenance information about the module executions used to pro-
duce a data item, as well as the parameter settings and intermediate data items passed between module executions.
However, authors/owners of workflows may wish to keep some of this information confidential. In particular, a mod-
ule may be proprietary, and users should not be able to infer its behavior by seeing mappings between all data inputs
and outputs.
The problem we address in this paper is the following: Given a workflow, abstractly modeled by a relation R, a
privacy requirement Γ and costs associated with data. The owner of the workflow decides which data (attributes) to
hide, and provides the user with a view R′ which is the projection of R over attributes which have not been hidden.
The goal is to minimize the cost of hidden data while guaranteeing that individual modules are Γ-private. We call this
the Secure-View problem. We formally define the problem, study its complexity, and offer algorithmic solutions.
1 Introduction
The importance of data provenance has been widely recognized. In the context of scientific workflows, systems such
as myGrid/Taverna [27], Kepler [7], and VisTrails [15] now capture and store provenance information, and a standard
for provenance representation called the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [24] has been designed. By maintaining
information about the module executions (processing steps) used to produce a data item, as well as the parameter
settings and intermediate data items passed between module executions, the validity and reliability of data can be
better understood and results be made reproducible.
However, authors/owners of workflows may wish to keep some of this provenance information private. For ex-
ample, intermediate data within an execution may contain sensitive information, such as the social security number,
a medical record, or financial information about an individual. Although users with the appropriate level of access
may be allowed to see such confidential data, making it available to all users is an unacceptable breach of privacy.
Beyond data privacy, a module itself may be proprietary, and hiding its description may not be enough: users without
the appropriate level of access should not be able to infer its functionality by observing all inputs and outputs of the
module. Finally, details of how certain modules in the workflow are connected may be proprietary, and therefore
showing how data is passed between modules may reveal too much of the structure of the workflow. There is thus
an inherent trade-off between the utility of provenance information and the privacy guarantees that authors/owners
desire.
While data privacy was studied in the context of statistical databases and ideas related to structural privacy were
dealt with in the context of workflow views, module privacy has not been addressed yet. Given the importance of
the issue [10], this paper therefore focuses on the problem of preserving the privacy of module functionality, i.e. the
mapping between input and output values produced by the module (rather than the actual algorithm that implements it).
Abstracting the workflow models in [27, 7, 15], we consider a module to be a finite relation which takes a set I of
input data (attributes), produces a set O of output data (attributes), and satisfies the functional dependency I −→ O.
A row in this relation represents one execution of the module. In a workflow, n such data processing modules are
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connected in a directed acyclic multigraph (network), and jointly produce a set of final outputs from a set of initial
inputs. Each module receives input data from one or more modules, or from the initial external input, and sends output
data to one or more modules, or produces the final output. Thus a workflow can be thought of as a relation which is
the input-output join of the constituent module relations. Each row in this relation represents a workflow execution,
and captures the provenance of data that is produced during that execution. We call this the provenance relation..
To ensure the privacy of module functionality, we extend the notion of `-diversity [22] to our network setting1: A
module with functionality m in a workflow is said to be Γ-private if for every input x, the actual value of the output
m(x) is indistinguishable from Γ−1 other possible values w.r.t. the visible data values in the provenance relation. This
is achieved by carefully selecting a subset of data items and hiding those values in all executions of the workflow – i.e.
by showing the user a view of the provenance relation for the workflow in which the selected data items (attributes)
are hidden. Γ-privacy of a module ensures that even with arbitrary computational power and access to the view for all
possible executions of workflow, an adversary can not guess the correct value of m(x) with probability > 1Γ .
Identical privacy guarantees can be achieved by hiding different subsets of data. To reflect the fact that some
data may be more valuable to the user than other data, we assign a cost to each data item in the workflow, which
indicates the utility lost to the user when the data value is hidden. It is important to note that, due to data sharing (i.e.
computed data items that are passed as input to more than one module in the workflow), hiding some data can be used
to guarantee privacy for more than one module in the network.
The problem we address in this paper is the following: We are given a workflow, abstractly modeled by a relation
R, a privacy requirement Γ and costs associated with data. An instance of R represents the set of workflow executions
that have been run. The owner of the workflow decides which attributes to hide, and provides the user with a view
R′ which is the projection of R over the visible attributes. The goal is to minimize the cost of hidden data while
guaranteeing that individual modules are Γ-private. We call this the secure-view problem. We formally define the
problem, study its complexity, and offer algorithmic solutions.
Contributions. Our first contribution is to formalize the notion of Γ-privacy of a private module when it is a
standalone entity (standalone privacy) as well as when it is a component of a workflow interacting with other modules
(workflow privacy). For standalone modules, we then analyze the computational and communication complexity of
obtaining a minimal cost set of input/output data items to hide such that the remaining, visible attributes guarantee
Γ-privacy (a safe subset). We call this the standalone secure-view problem.
Our second set of contributions is to study workflows in which all modules are private, i.e. modules for which the
user has no a priori knowledge and whose behavior must be hidden. For such all-private workflows, we analyze the
complexity of finding a minimum cost set of data items in the workflow, as a whole, to hide such that the remaining
visible attributes guarantee Γ-privacy for all modules. We call this the workflow secure-view problem. Although the
privacy of a module within a workflow is inherently linked to the workflow topology and functionality of other mod-
ules, we are able to show that guaranteeing workflow secure-views in this setting essentially reduces to implementing
the standalone privacy requirements for each module. We then study two variants of the workflow secure-view prob-
lem, one in which module privacy is specified in terms of attribute sets (set constraints) and one in which module
privacy is specified in terms of input/output cardinalities (cardinality constraints). Both variants are easily shown to
be NP-hard, and we give poly-time approximation algorithms for these problems. While the cardinality constraints
version has an linear-programming-based O(logn)-approximation algorithm, the set constraints version is much harder
to approximate. However, both variants becomes more tractable when the workflow has bounded data sharing, i.e.
when a data item acts as input to a small number of modules. In this case a constant factor approximation is possible,
although the problem remains NP-hard even without any data sharing
Our third set of contributions is in general workflows, i.e workflows which contain private modules as well as mod-
ules whose behavior is known (public modules). Here we show that ensuring standalone privacy of private modules
no longer guarantees their workflow privacy. However, by making some of the public modules private (privatization)
we can attain workflow privacy of all private modules in the workflow. Since privatization has a cost, the optimization
problem, becomes much harder: Even without data sharing the problem isΩ(logn)-hard to approximate. However, for
both all-private and general workflows, there is an LP-based `max-approximation algorithm, where `max is the length
of longest requirement list for any module.
1In the Related Work, we discuss why a stronger notion of privacy, like differential privacy, is not suitable here.
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Related Work. Workflow privacy has been considered in [9, 17, 16]. In [9], the authors discuss a framework to
output a partial view of a workflow that conforms to a given set of access permissions on the connections between
modules and data on input/output ports. The problem of ensuring the lawful use of data according to specified privacy
policies has been considered in [17, 16]. The focus of the work is a policy language for specifying relationships among
data and module sets, and their properties relevant to privacy. Although all these papers address workflow privacy,
the privacy notions are somewhat informal and no guarantees on the quality of the solution are provided in terms of
privacy and utility. Furthermore, our work is the first, to our knowledge, to address module privacy rather than data
privacy.
Secure provenance for workflows has been studied in [21, 8, 18]. The goal is to ensure that provenance information
has not been forged or corrupted, and a variety of cryptographic and trusted computing techniques are proposed. In
contrast, we assume that provenance information has not been corrupted, and focus on ensuring module privacy.
In [23], the authors study information disclosure in data exchange, where given a set of public views, the goal is
to decide if they reveal any information about a private view. This does not directly apply to our problem, where the
private elements are the (x,m(x)) relations. For example, if all x values are shown without showing any of the m(x)
values for a module m, then information is revealed in their setting but not in our setting.2
Privacy-preserving data mining has received considerable attention (see surveys [2, 31]). The goal is to hide
individual data attributes while retaining the suitability of data for mining patterns. For example, the technique of
anonymizing data makes each record indistinguishable from a large enough set of other records in certain identifying
attributes [30, 22, 3]. Privacy preserving approaches were studied for social networks [6, 28] auditing queries [25]
and in other contexts. Our notion of standalone module privacy is close to that of `-diversity [22], in which the values
of non-sensitive attributes are generalized so that, for every such generalization, there are at least ` different values of
sensitive attributes. We extend this work in two ways: First, we place modules (relations) in a network of modules,
which significantly complicates the problem, Second, we analyze the complexity of attaining standalone as well as
workflow privacy of modules.
Another widely used technique is that of data perturbation where some noise (usually random) is added to the
the output of a query or to the underlying database. This technique is often used in statistical databases, where a
query computes some aggregate function over the dataset [11] and the goal is to preserve the privacy of data elements.
In contrast, in our setting the private elements are (x,m(x)) pairs for a private module m and the queries are select-
project-join style queries over the provenance relation rather than aggregate queries.
Privacy in statistical databases is typically quantified using differential privacy, which requires that the output
distribution is almost invariant to the inclusion of any particular record (see surveys [12, 13] and the references therein).
Although this is the strongest notion of privacy known to date, no deterministic algorithm can guarantee differential
privacy. Thus differential privacy is unsuitable for our purposes, since adding random noise to provenance information
may render it useless; provenance is used to ensure reproducibility of experiments and therefore data values must be
accurate. Our approach of outputting a safe view allows the user to know the name of all data items and the exact
values of data that is visible. The user also does not lose any utility in terms of connections in the workflow, and can
infer exactly which module produced which visible data item or whether two visible data items depend on each other.
Organization. Section 2 defines our workflow model and formalizes the notions of Γ-privacy of a module, both when
it is standalone and when it appears in a workflow. The secure-view problem for standalone module privacy is studied
in Section 3. Section 4 then studies the problem for workflows consisting only of private modules, whereas Section 5
generalizes the results to general workflows consisting of both public and private modules. Finally we conclude and
discuss directions for future work in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We start by introducing some notation and formalizing our notion of privacy. We first consider the privacy of a single
module, which we call standalone module privacy. Then we consider privacy when modules are connected in a
workflow, which we call workflow module privacy.
2In contrast, it can be shown that showing all m(x) values while hiding the x’s, may reveal information in our setting.
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2.1 Modules and Relations
We model a module m with a set I of input variables and a set O of (computed) output variables as a relation R over a
set of attributes A= I∪O that satisfies the functional dependency I→O. In other words, I serves as a (not necessarily
minimal) key for R. We assume that I ∩O = /0 and will refer to I as the input attributes of R and to O as its output
attributes.
We assume that the values of each attribute a ∈ A come from a finite but arbitrarily large domain ∆a, and let
Dom = ∏a∈I ∆a and Range = ∏a∈O∆a denote the domain and range of the module m respectively. The relation R
thus represents the (possibly partial) function m : Dom→ Range and tuples in R describe executions of m, namely for
every t ∈ R, piO(t) = m(piI(t)). We overload the standard notation for projection, piA(R), and use it for a tuple t ∈ R.
Thus piA(t), for a set A of attributes, denotes the projection of t to the attributes in A.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows a simple workflow involving three modules m1,m2,m3 with boolean input and output
attributes; we will return to it shortly and focus for now on the top module m1. Module m1 takes as input two data
items, a1 and a2, and computes a3 = a1∨a2, a4 =¬(a1∧a2) and a5 =¬(a1⊕a2). (The symbol ⊕ denotes XOR).
The relational representation (functionality) of module m1 is shown in Figure 1c as relation R1, with the functional
dependency a1a2 −→ a3a4a5. For clarity, we have added I (input) and O (output) above the attribute names to indicate
their role.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
(b) R: Workflow executions
I O
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
(c) R1: Functionality of m1
I∩V O∩V
a1 a3 a5
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
(d) RV =piV (R1)
Figure 1: A sample workflow, and, workflow and module executions as relations
2.2 Standalone Module Privacy
Our approach to ensuring standalone module privacy, for a module represented by the relation R, will be to hide a
carefully chosen subset of R’s attributes. In other words, we will project R on a restricted subset V of attributes (called
the visible attributes of R), allowing users access only to the view RV = piV (R). The remaining, non visible, attributes
of R are called hidden attributes.
We distinguish below two types of modules. (1) Public modules whose behavior is fully known to users. Here
users have a priori knowledge about the full content of R and, even if given only the view RV , they are able to fully
(and exactly) reconstruct R. Examples include reformatting or sorting modules. (2) Private modules where such a
priori knowledge does not exist. Here, the only information available to users, on the module’s behavior, is the one
given by RV . Examples include proprietary software, e.g. a genetic disorder susceptibility module3.
Given a view (projected relation) RV of a private module m, the possible worlds of m are all the possible full
relations (over the same schema as R) that are consistent with RV w.r.t the visible attributes. Formally,
Definition 1. Let m be a private module with a corresponding relation R, having input and output attributes I and O,
resp., and let V ⊆ I ∪O. The set of possible worlds for R w.r.t. V , denoted Worlds(R,V ), consist of all relations R′
over the same schema as R that satisfy the functional dependency I→ O and where piV (R′) = piV (R).
Example 2. Returning to module m1, suppose the visible attributes are V = {a1,a3,a5} resulting in the view RV in
Figure 1d. For clarity, we have added I ∩V (visible input) and O∩V (visible output) above the attribute names to
indicate their role. Naturally, R1 ∈ Worlds(R1,V ). Figure 2 shows four additional sample relations R11,R21,R31,R41 in
Worlds(R1,V ), such that ∀i∈ [1,4],piV (Ri1) = piV (R1) = RV . (Overall there are sixty four relations in Worlds(R1,V )).
3We discuss in Section 6 how partial prior knowledge can be handled by our approach.
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To guarantee privacy of a module m, the view RV should ensure some level of uncertainly w.r.t the value of the
output m(piI(t)), for tuples t ∈ R. To define this, we introduce the notion of Γ-standalone-privacy, for a given parameter
Γ ≥ 1. Informally, RV is Γ-standalone-private if for every t ∈ R, the possible worlds Worlds(R,V ) contain at least Γ
distinct output values that could be the result of m(piI(t)).
Definition 2. Let m be a private module with a corresponding relation R having input and output attributes I and
O resp. Then m is Γ-standalone-private w.r.t a set of visible attributes V , if for every tuple x ∈ piI(R), |OUTx,m| ≥ Γ,
where OUTx,m = {y | ∃R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ), ∃t′ ∈ R′ s.t x = piI(t′)∧y = piO(t′)}.
If m is Γ-standalone-private w.r.t. V , then we will call V a safe subset for m and Γ.
Practically, Γ-standalone-privacy means that for any input the adversary cannot guess m’s output with probability
greater than 1Γ .
Example 3. It can be verified that, if V = {a1,a3,a5} then for all x ∈ piI(R1), |Outx| ≥ 4, so {a1,a3,a5} is safe for
m1 and Γ= 4. As an example, from Figure 2, when x = (0,0), OUTx,m = {(0,0,1),(0,1,1),(1,0,0),(1,1,0)} (hidden
attributes are underlined). Also, hiding any two output attributes from O = {a3,a4,a5} ensures standalone privacy
for Γ = 4. For example, if V = {a1,a2,a3} (i.e. the output attributes {a4,a5} are hidden), then the input (0,0) can
be mapped to one of (0,0,0),(0,0,1),(0,1,0) and (0,1,1); this holds for other assignments of input attributes as
well. However, V = {a3,a4,a5} (i.e. when only the input attributes are hidden) is not safe for Γ= 4: for any input x,
OUTx,m = {(0,1,1),(1,1,0),(1,0,1)}, containing only three possible output tuples.
There may be several safe subsets V for a given module m and parameter Γ. Some of the corresponding RV
views may be preferable to others, e.g. they provide users with more useful information, allow to answer more
common/critical user queries, etc. Let V = (I ∪O) \V denote the attributes of R that do not belong to the view. If
c(V ) denotes the penalty of hiding the attributes in V , a natural goal is to choose a view s.t. that c(V ) is minimized.
To understand the difficulty of this problem, we study a version of the problem where the cost function is additive:
each attribute a has some penalty value c(a) and the penalty of hiding V is the sum of the penalties of the individual
attributes, c(V ) = Σa∈Vc(a). We call this optimization problem the standalone Secure-View problem and discuss
it in Section 3.
2.3 Workflows and Relations
A workflow W consists of a set of modules m1, · · · ,mn, connected as a DAG (see, for example, the workflow in
Figure 1). Each module mi has a set Ii of input attributes and a set Oi of output attributes. We assume that (1) for
each module, the names of its input and output attributes are disjoint, i.e. Ii ∩Oi = /0, (2) the names of the output
attributes of distinct modules are disjoint, namely Oi∩O j = /0, for i 6= j (since each data item is produced by a unique
module), and (3) whenever an output of a module mi is fed as input to a module m j the corresponding output and input
attributes of mi and m j have the same name. The DAG shape of the workflow guarantees that these requirements are
not contradictory.
We model executions of W as a relation R over the set of attributes A=∪ni=1(Ii∪Oi), satisfying the set of functional
dependencies F = {Ii→ Oi : i ∈ [1,n]}. Each tuple in R describes an execution of the workflow W . In particular, for
every t ∈ R, and every i ∈ [1,n], piOi(t) = mi(piIi(t)).
Example 4. Returning to the sample workflow in Figure 1, the input and output attributes of modules m1,m2,m3
respectively are (i) I1 = {a1,a2}, O1 = {a3,a4,a5}, (ii) I2 = {a3,a4}, O2 = {a6} and (iii) I3 = {a4,a5}, O3 = {a7}.
The underlying functional dependencies in the relation R in Figure 1b reflect the keys of the constituent modules, e.g.
from m1 we have a1a2 −→ a3a4a5, from m2 we have a3a4 −→ a6, and from m3 we have a4a5 −→ a7.
Note that the output of a module may be input to several modules, hence the names of the input attributes of distinct
modules are not necessarily disjoint. It is therefore possible that Ii ∩ I j 6= /0 for i 6= j. We call this data sharing and
define the degree of data sharing in a workflow:
Definition 3. A workflow W is said to have γ-bounded data sharing if every attribute in W can appear in the left hand
side of at most γ functional dependencies Ii→ Oi.
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In the workflow of our running example, γ = 2. Intuitively, if a workflow has γ-bounded data sharing then a data
item can be fed as input to at most γ different modules. In the following sections we will see the implication of such a
bound on the complexity of the problems studied.
I O
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
(a) R11
I O
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
(b) R21
I O
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
(c) R31
I O
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
(d) R41
Figure 2: Ri1 ∈ Worlds(R1,V ), i ∈ [1,4]
2.4 Workflow Module Privacy
To define privacy in the context of a workflow, we first extend our notion of possible worlds to a workflow view.
Consider the view RV = piV (R) of a workflow relation R. Since the workflow may contain private as well as public
modules, a possible world for RV is a full relation that not only agrees with RV on the content of the visible attributes,
but is also consistent w.r.t the expected behavior of the public modules. In the following definitions, m1, · · · ,mn denote
the modules in the workflow W and F denotes the set of functional dependencies Ii→Oi, i ∈ [1,n] in the relation R.
Definition 4. The set of possible worlds for the workflow relation R w.r.t. V , denoted also Worlds(R,V ), consists
of all the relations R′ over the same attributes as R that satisfy the functional dependencies in F and where (1)
piV (R′) = piV (R), and (2) for every public module mi in W and every tuple t′ ∈ R′, piOi(t′) = mi(piIi(t′)).
Note that when a workflow consists only of private modules, the second constraint does not need to be enforced.
We call these all-private workflows and study them in Section 4. We then show in Section 5 that attaining privacy
when public modules are also used is fundamentally harder.
We are now ready to define the notion of Γ-workflow-privacy, for a given parameter Γ ≥ 1. Informally, a view
RV is Γ-workflow-private if for every tuple t ∈ R, and every private module mi in the workflow, the possible worlds
Worlds(R,V ) contain at least Γ distinct output values that could be the result of mi(piIi(t)).
Definition 5. A private module mi in W is Γ-workflow-private w.r.t a set of visible attributes V , if for every tuple
x ∈ piIi(R), |OUTx,W | ≥ Γ, where OUTx,W = {y | ∃R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ), s.t., ∀t′ ∈ R′ x = piIi(t′)⇒ y = piOi(t′)}.
W is called Γ-private if every private module mi in W is Γ-workflow-private.
If W (resp. mi) is Γ-private (Γ-workflow-private) w.r.t. V , then we call V a safe subset for Γ-privacy of W (Γ-
workflow-privacy of mi).
For simplicity, in the above definition we assumed that the privacy requirement of every module mi is the same Γ.
The results and proofs in this paper remain unchanged when different modules mi have different privacy requirements
Γi.
In the rest of the paper, for a set of visible attributes V ⊆ A, V = A \V will denote the hidden attributes in the
workflow. The following proposition is easy to verify, which will be useful later:
Proposition 1. If V is a safe subset for Γ-workflow-privacy of a module mi in W, then any V ′ such that V ′ ⊆ V (or,
V ′ ⊇V ) also guarantees Γ-workflow-privacy of mi.
As we illustrate in the sequel, given a workflow W and a parameter Γ there may be several incomparable (in terms
of set inclusion) sets V of visible attributes w.r.t. which W is Γ-private. Our goal will be to choose one that minimizes
the penalty c(V ) = Σa∈Vc(a) of the hidden attributes V – this we call the workflow Secure-View problem, or simply
the Secure-View problem. The candidates are naturally the maximal, in terms of set inclusion, safe sets V (and
correspondingly the minimal V s).
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2.5 Complexity Classes and Approximation
In the following sections we will study the Secure-View problem: minimize cost of the hidden attributes that
ensures that a workflow is Γ-private. We will prove that this problem is NP-hard even in very restricted cases and
study poly-time approximation algorithms as well as the hardness of approximations for different versions of the
problem. We will use the following common notions of complexity and approximation: An algorithm is said to be a
µ(n)-approximation algorithm for a given optimization problem, for some non-decreasing function µ(n) : N+→ N,
if on every input of size n it computes a solution where the value is within a factor of µ(n) of the value returned by an
optimal algorithm for the problem. An optimization problem is said to be µ(n)-hard to approximate if for all inputs
of size n, for all sufficiently large n, a µ(n)-approximation algorithm for the problem cannot exist assuming some
standard complexity results hold. In some parts of the paper (Theorems 5, 6, 10), we will use complexity results of the
form NP 6⊆DT IME(n f (n)), where f (n) is a poly-logarithmic or sub-logarithmic function of n and DT IME represents
deterministic time. For example, the hardness result in Theorem 5 says that there cannot be an O(logn)-approximation
algorithm unless all problems in NP have O(nlog logn)-time deterministic exact algorithms. Finally, a problem is said
to be APX-hard if there exists a constant ε > 0 such that a (1+ ε)-approximation in poly-time would imply P = NP.
If a problem is APX-hard, then the problem cannot have a PTAS, i.e, a (1+ε)-approximation algorithm which runs in
polynomial time for all constant ε > 0, unless P = NP.
3 Standalone Module Privacy
We start our study of workflow privacy by considering the privacy of a standalone module, which is the simplest
special case of a workflow. Hence understanding it is a first step towards understanding the general case. We will also
see that standalone-privacy guarantees of individual modules may be used as building blocks for attaining workflow
privacy.
We analyze below the time complexity of obtaining (minimal cost) guarantees for standalone module privacy.
Though the notion of Γ-standalone-privacy is similar to the well-known notion of `-diversity [22], to the best of our
knowledge the time complexity of this problem has not been studied.
Optimization problems and parameters. Consider a standalone module m with input attributes I, output attributes
O, and a relation R. Recall that a visible subset of attributes V is called a safe subset for module m and privacy
requirement Γ, if m is Γ-standalone-private w.r.t. V (see Definition 2). If each attribute a ∈ I ∪O has cost c(a),
the standalone Secure-View problem aims to find a safe subset V s.t. the cost of the hidden attributes, c(V ) =
∑a∈V c(a), is minimized. The corresponding decision version will take a cost limit C as an additional input, and
decide whether there exists a safe subset V such that c(V )≤C.
One natural way of solving the optimization version of the standalone Secure-View problem is to consider all
possible subsets V ⊆ I∪O, check if V is safe, and return the safe subset V s.t. c(V ) is minimized. This motivates us
to define and study the simpler Safe-View problem, which takes a subset V as input and decides whether V is a safe
subset.
To understand how much of the complexity of the standalone Secure-View problem comes from the need to
consider different subsets of attributes, and what is due to the need to determine the safety of subsets, we study the
time complexity of standalone Secure-View, with and without access to an oracle for the Safe-View problem,
henceforth called a Safe-View oracle. A Safe-View oracle takes a subset V ⊆ I∪O as input and answers whether
V is safe. In the presence of a Safe-View oracle, the time complexity of the Safe-View problem is mainly due to
the number of oracle calls, and hence we study the communication complexity. Without access to such an oracle, we
also study the computational complexity of this problem.
In our discussion below, k = |I|+ |O| denotes the total number of attributes in the relation R, and N denotes the
number of rows in R (i.e. the number of executions). Then N ≤ ∏a∈I |∆a| ≤ δ |I| ≤ δ k where ∆a is the domain of
attribute a and δ is the maximum domain size of attributes.
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3.1 Lower Bounds
We start with lower bounds for the Safe-View problem. Observe that this also gives lower bounds for the standalone
Secure-View problem without a Safe-View oracle. To see this, consider a set V of attributes and assume that
each attribute in V has cost > 0 whereas all other attributes have cost zero. Then Safe-View has a positive answer
for V iff the standalone Secure-View problem has a solution with cost = 0 (i.e. one that hides only the attributes
V ).
Communication complexity of Safe-View . Given a visible subset V ⊆ I ∪O, we show that deciding whether V
is safe needs Ω(N) time. Note that just to read the table as input takes Ω(N) time. So the lower bound of Ω(N) does
not make sense unless we assume the presence of a data supplier (we avoid using the term “oracle” to distinguish it
from Safe-View oracle) which supplies the tuples of R on demand: Given an assignment x of the input attributes
I, the data supplier outputs the value y = m(x) of the output attributes O. The following theorem shows the Ω(N)
communication complexity lower bound in terms of the number of calls to the data supplier; namely, that (up to a
constant factor) one indeed needs to view the full relation.
Theorem 1. (Safe-View Communication Complexity) Given a module m, a subset V ⊆ I ∪O, and a privacy
requirement Γ, deciding whether V is safe for m and Γ requires Ω(N) calls to the data supplier, where N is the number
of tuples in the relation R of m.
Proof sketch. This theorem is proved by a reduction from the set-disjointness problem, where Alice and Bob hold two
subsets A and B of a universe U and the goal is decide whether A∩B 6= φ . This problem is known to have Ω(N)
communication complexity where N is the number of elements in the universe. Details are in Appendix A.
Computational Complexity of Safe-View : The above Ω(N) computation complexity of Safe-View holds
when the relation R is given explicitly tuple by tuple. The following theorem shows that even when R is described
implicitly in a succinct manner, there cannot be a poly-time (in the number of attributes) algorithm to decide whether
a given subset V is safe unless P = NP (proof is in Appendix A).
Theorem 2. (Safe-View Computational Complexity) Given a module m with a poly-size (in k= |I|+|O|) descrip-
tion of functionality, a subset V ⊆ I ∪O, and a privacy requirement Γ, deciding whether V is safe w.r.t. m and Γ is
co-NP-hard in k.
Proof sketch. The proof of this theorem works by a reduction from the UNSAT problem, where given a boolean
CNF formula g on variables x1, · · · ,x`, the goal is to decide whether, for all assignments of the variables, g is not
satisfiable. Here given any assignment of the variables x1, · · · ,x`, g(x1, · · · ,x`) can be evaluated in polynomial time,
which simulates the function of the data supplier.
Lower Bound of Standalone Secure-View with a Safe-View Oracle: Now suppose we have access to a
Safe-View oracle, which takes care of the “hardness” of the Safe-View problem given in Theorems 1 and 2, in
constant time. The oracle takes a visible subset V ⊆ I∪O as input, and answers whether V is safe for module m and
privacy requirement Γ. The following theorem shows that the decision version of standalone Secure-View remains
hard (i.e. not solvable in poly-time in the number of attributes):
Theorem 3. (Standalone Secure-ViewCommunication Complexity, with Safe-View oracle) Given a Safe-View or-
acle and a cost limit C, deciding whether there exists a safe subset V ⊆ I ∪O with cost bounded by C requires 2Ω(k)
oracle calls, where k = |I|+ |O|.
Proof sketch. The proof of this theorem involves a novel construction of two functions, m1 and m2, on ` input attributes
and a single output attribute, such that for m1 the minimum cost of a safe subset is 3`4 whereas for m2 it is
`
2 (C =
`
2 ).
In particular, for both m1 and m2, all subsets of size < `4 are safe and all other subsets are unsafe, except that for m2,
there is exactly one special subset of size `2 such that this subset and all subsets thereof are safe.
We show that for an algorithm using 2o(k) calls, there always remains at least one special subset of size `2 that is
consistent with all previous answers to queries. Hence after 2o(k) calls, if the algorithm decides that there is a safe
subset with cost≤C, we choose m to be m1; on the other hand, if it says that there is no such subset, we set m=m2. In
8
both the cases the answer of the algorithm is wrong which shows that there cannot be such an algorithm distinguishing
these two cases with 2o(k) calls (details in Appendix A).
3.2 Upper Bounds
The lower bound results given above show that solving the standalone Secure-View problem is unlikely in time
sub-exponential in k or sub-linear in N. We now present simple algorithms for solving the Secure-View and
Safe-View problems, in time polynomial in N and exponential in k.
First note that, with access to a Safe-View oracle, the standalone Secure-View problem can be easily solved
in O(2k) time, by calling the oracle for all 2k possible subsets and outputting the safe subset with minimum cost.
Without access to a Safe-View oracle, we first “read” relation R using N data supplier calls. Once R is available,
the simple algorithm sketched below implements the Safe-View oracle (i.e. tests if a set V of attributes is safe) and
works in time O(2kN2): For a visible subset V , we look at all possible assignments to the attributes in I \V . For each
input value we then check if it leads to at least Γ∏a∈O\V |∆a| different values of the visible output attributes in O∩V (∆a is
the domain of attribute a). This is a necessary and sufficient condition for guaranteeing Γ privacy, since by all possible
∏a∈O\V |∆a| extensions of the output attributes, for each input, there will be Γ different possible output values (details
in Appendix A.4).
We mention here also that essentially the same algorithms (with same upper bounds) can be used to output all safe
attribute sets of a standalone module, rather than just one with minimum cost. Such exhaustive enumeration will be
useful in the following sections.
Remarks. These results indicate that, in the worse case, finding a minimal-cost safe attribute set for a module may take
time that is exponential in the number of attributes. Note, however, that the number of attributes of a single module
is typically not large (often less than 10, see [1]), so the computation is still feasible. Expert knowledge of module
designers, about the module’s behavior and safe attribute sets may also be exploited to speed up the computation.
Furthermore, a given module is often used in many workflows. For example, sequence comparison modules, like
BLAST or FASTA, are used in many different biological workflows. We will see that safe subsets for individual
modules can be used as building blocks for attaining privacy for the full workflow. The effort invested in deriving safe
subsets for a module is thus amortized over all uses.
4 All-Private Workflows
We are now ready to consider workflows that consist of several modules. We first consider in this section workflows
where all modules are private (called all-private workflows). Workflows with a mixture of private and public modules
are then considered in Section 5.
As in Section 3, we want to find a safe visible subset V with minimum cost s.t. all the modules in the workflow
are Γ-workflow-private w.r.t. V (see Definition 5). One option is to devise algorithms similar to those described for
standalone modules in the previous section. However, the time complexity of those algorithms is now exponential
in the total number of attributes of all modules in the workflow which can be as large as Ω(nk), n being the number
of modules in the workflow and k the maximum number of attributes of a single module. To avoid the exponential
dependency on n, the number of modules in the workflow,which may be large [1], and to exploit the safe attribute
subsets for standalone modules, which may have been already computed, we attempt in this section to assemble
workflow privacy guarantees out of standalone module guarantees. We first prove, in Section 4.1, that this is indeed
possible. Then, in the rest of this section, we study the optimization problem of obtaining a safe view with minimum
cost.
Let W be a workflow consisting of modules m1, · · · ,mn, where Ii,Oi denote the input and output attributes of
mi, i ∈ [1,n], respectively. We use below Ri to denote the relation for the standalone module mi. The relations
R = R1 on R2 on · · · on Rn, with attributes A = ⋃n1=1(Ii∪Oi), then describes the possible executions of W . Note that if
one of the modules in W is not a one-to-one function then the projection piIi∪Oi(R) of the relation R on Ii∪Oi may be
a subset of the (standalone) module relation Ri.
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In this section (and throughout the rest of the paper), for a set of visible attributes V ⊆ A, V = A\V will denote the
hidden attributes. Further, Vi = (Ii∪Oi)∩V will denote the visible attributes for module mi, whereas Vi = (Ii∪Oi)\Vi
will denote the hidden attributes for mi, for i ∈ [1,n].
4.1 Standalone-Privacy vs. Workflow-Privacy
We show that if a set of visible attributes guarantees Γ-standalone-privacy for a module, then if the module is placed
in a workflow where only a subset of those attributes is made visible, then Γ-workflow-privacy is guaranteed for the
module in this workflow. In other words, in an all-private workflow, hiding the union of the corresponding hidden
attributes of the individual modules guarantees Γ-workflow-privacy for all of them4. We formalize this next.
Theorem 4. Let W be an all-private workflow with modules m1, · · · ,mn. Given a parameter Γ ≥ 1, let Vi ⊆ (Ii∪Oi)
be a set of visible attributes w.r.t which mi, i ∈ [1,n], is Γ-standalone-private. Then the workflow W is Γ-private w.r.t
the set of visible attributes V s.t. V =
⋃n
i=1 Vi.
Before we prove the theorem, recall that Γ-standalone-privacy of a module mi requires that for every input x to
the module, there are at least Γ potential outputs of x in the possible worlds Worlds(Ri,Vi) of the standalone module
relation Ri w.r.t. Vi; similarly, Γ-workflow-privacy of mi requires at least Γ potential outputs of x in the possible
worlds Worlds(R,V ) of the workflow relation R w.r.t. V . Since R = R1 on · · · on Rn, a possible approach to prove
Theorem 4 may be to show that, whenever the hidden attributes for mi are also hidden in the workflow W , any relation
R′i ∈ Worlds(Ri,Vi) has a corresponding relation R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ) s.t. R′i = piIi∪Oi(R′). If this would hold, then for
V =
⋃n
i=1 Vi, the set of possible outputs, for any input tuple x to a module mi, will remain unchanged.
Unfortunately, Proposition 2 below shows that the above approach fails. Indeed, |Worlds(R,V )| can be signifi-
cantly smaller than |Worlds(Ri,Vi)| even for very simple workflows.
Proposition 2. There exist a workflow W with relation R, a module m1 in W with (standalone) relation R1, and a set
of visible attributes V1 that guarantees both Γ-standalone-privacy and Γ-workflow-privacy of m1, such that the ratio
of |Worlds(R1,V1)| and |Worlds(R,V1)| is doubly exponential in the number of attributes of W.
Proof sketch. To prove the proposition, we construct a simple workflow with two modules m1,m2 connected as a
chain. Both m1,m2 are one-one functions with k boolean inputs and k boolean outputs (for example, assume that m1
is an identity function, whereas m2 reverses the values of its k inputs). The module m1 gets initial input attribute
set I1, produces O1 = I2 which is fed to the module m2 as input, and m2 produces final attribute set O2. Let V1 be
an arbitrary subset of O1 such that |V1| = logΓ (we assume that Γ is a power of 2). It can be verified that, m1 as a
standalone module is Γ-standalone-private w.r.t. visible attributes V1 and both m1,m2, being one-one modules, are
Γ-workflow-private w.r.t. V1.
We show that the one-one nature of m1 and m2 restricts the size of Worlds(R,V1) compared to that of Worlds(R1,V1).
Since both m1 and m2 are one-one functions, the workflow W also computes a one-one function. Hence any relation
S in Worlds(R,V1) has to compute a one-one function as well. But when m1 was standalone, any function consis-
tent with V1 could be a member of Worlds(R1,V1). By a careful computation, the ratio can be shown to be doubly
exponential in k (details in Appendix B).
Nevertheless, we show below that for every input x of the module, the set of its possible outputs, in these worlds,
is exactly the same as that in the original (much larger number of) module worlds. Hence privacy is indeed preserved.
In proving Theorem 4, our main technical tool is Lemma 1, which states that given a set of visible attributes Vi of
a standalone module mi, the set of possible outputs for every input x to mi remains unchanged when mi is placed in an
all-private workflow, provided the corresponding hidden attributes Vi remains hidden in the workflow.
Recall that OUTx,mi and OUTx,W denote the possible output for an input x to module mi w.r.t. a set of visible
attributes when mi is standalone and in a workflow W respectively (see Definition 2 and Definition 5).
Lemma 1. Consider any module mi and any input x ∈ piIi(R). If y ∈ OUTx,mi w.r.t. a set of visible attributes Vi ⊆
(Ii∪Oi), then y ∈ OUTx,W w.r.t. Vi∪ (A\ (Ii∪Oi)).
4By Proposition 1, this also means that hiding any superset of this union would also be safe for the same privacy guarantee.
10
The above lemma directly implies Theorem 4:
of Theorem 4. We are given that each module mi is Γ-standalone-private w.r.t. Vi, i.e., |OUTx,mi | ≥ Γ for all input x
to mi, for all modules mi, i ∈ [1,n] (see Definition 2). From Lemma 1, this implies that for all input x to all modules
mi, |OUTx,W | ≥ Γ w.r.t V ′ = Vi ∪ (A \ (Ii ∪Oi)). For this choice of V ′, V ′ = A \V ′ = (Ii ∪Oi) \Vi = Vi (because,
Vi ⊆ Ii∪Oi ⊆ A). Now, using Proposition 1, when the visible attributes set V is such that V =⋃ni=1 Vi ⊇Vi =V ′, every
module mi is Γ-workflow-private.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 4 we thus only need to prove Lemma 1. For this, we use the following auxiliary
lemma.
Lemma 2. Let mi be a standalone module with relation Ri, let x be an input to mi, and let Vi ⊆ (Ii∪Oi) be a subset
of visible attributes. If y ∈ OUTx,mi then there exists an input x′ ∈ piIi(Ri) to mi with output y′ = mi(x′) such that
piVi∩Ii(x) = piVi∩Ii(x′) and piVi∩Oi(y) = piVi∩Oi(y′).
The statement of the lemma can be illustrated with the module m1 whose relation R1 appears Figure 1c. Its
visible portion (for visible attributes a1,a3,a5) is given in Figure 1d. Consider the input x = (0,0) to m1 and the
output y = (1,0,0). For V = {a1,a3,a5}, y ∈ OUTx,m1 (see Figure 2c). This is because there exists x′ = (0,1), s.t.
y′ = m1(x′) = (1,1,0), and, x,x′ and y,y′ have the same values of the visible attributes (a1 and {a3,a5} respectively).
Note that y does not need to be the actual output m1(x) on x or even share the same values of the visible attributes
(indeed, m1(x) = (0,1,1)). We defer the proof of Lemma 2 to Appendix B and instead briefly explain how it is used
to prove Lemma 1.
Proof sketch of Lemma 1. Let us fix a module mi, an input x to mi and a candidate output y ∈ OUTx,mi for x w.r.t.
visible attributes Vi. We already argued that, for V =Vi∪ (A\ (Ii∪Oi)), V = A\V = (Ii∪Oi)\Vi =Vi. We will show
that y∈ OUTx,W w.r.t. visible attributes V by showing the existence of a possible world R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ), for V =Vi,
s.t. piIi(t) = x and piOi(t) = y for some t ∈ R′.
We start by replacing module mi by a new module gi such that gi(x) = y as required. But due to data sharing,
other modules in the workflow can have input and output attributes from Ii and Oi. Hence if we leave the modules
m j, j 6= i, unchanged, there may be inconsistency in the values of the visible attributes, and the relation produced
by the join of the standalone relations of the module sequence 〈m1, · · · ,mi−1,gi,mi+1, · · · ,mn〉 may not be a member
of Worlds(R,V ). To resolve this, we consider the modules in a topological order, and change the definition of all
modules m1, · · · ,mn to g1, · · · ,gn (some modules may remain unchanged). In proving the above, the main idea is to
use tuple and function flipping (formal definition in the appendix). If a module m j shares attributes from Ii or Oi,
the new definition g j of m j involves flipping the input to m j, apply m j on this flipped input, and then flipping the
output again to the output value. The proof shows that by consistently flipping all modules, the visible attribute values
remain consistent with the original workflow relation and we get a member of the possible worlds. (Details appear in
Appendix B).
It is important to note that the assumption of all-private workflow is crucial in proving Lemma 1 – if some of the
modules m j are public, we can not redefine them to g j (the projection to the public modules should be unchanged -
see Definition 5) and we may not get a member of Worlds(R,V ). We will return to this point in Section 5 when we
consider workflows with a mixture of private and public modules.
4.2 The Secure-View Problem
We have seen above that one can assemble workflow privacy guarantees out of the standalone module guarantees.
Recall however that each individual module may have several possible safe attributes sets (see, e.g., Example 3).
Assembling different sets naturally lead to solutions with different cost. The following example shows that assembling
optimal (cheapest) safe attributes of the individual modules may not lead to an optimal safe attributes set for the full
workflow. The key observation is that, due to data sharing, it may be more cost effective to hide expensive shared
attributes rather than cheap non-shared ones (though later we show that the problem remains NP-hard even without
data sharing).
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Example 5. Consider a workflow with n+2 modules, m,m1, · · · ,mn,m′. The module m gets an input data item a1, with
cost 1, and sends as output the same data item, a2, with cost 1+ ε , ε > 0, to all the mi-s. Each mi then sends a data
item bi to m′ with cost 1. Assume that standalone privacy is preserved for module m if either its incoming or outgoing
data is hidden and for m′ if any of its incoming data is hidden. Also assume that standalone privacy is preserved for
each mi module if either its incoming or its outgoing data is hidden. As standalone modules, m will choose to hide
a1, each mi will choose to hide the outgoing data item bi, and m′ will choose to hide any of the bi-s. The union of the
optimal solutions for the standalone modules has cost n+1. However, a lowest cost solution for preserving workflow
privacy is to hide a2 and any one of the bi-s. This assembly of (non optimal) solutions for the individual modules has
cost 2+ ε . In this case, the ratio of the costs of the union of standalone optimal solutions and the workflow optimal
solution is Ω(n).
This motivates us to define the combinatorial optimization problem Secure-View (for workflow secure view),
which generalizes the Secure-View problem studied in Section 3. The goal of the Secure-View problem is to
choose, for each module, a safe set of attributes (among its possible sets of safe attributes) s.t. together the selected
sets yield a minimal cost safe solution for the workflow. We define this formally below. In particular, we consider the
following two variants of the problem, trading-off expressibility and succinctness.
Set constraints. The possible safe solutions for a given module can be given in the form of a list of hidden attribute
sets. Specifically, we assume that we are given, for each module mi, i ∈ [1,n], a list of pairs Li = 〈(I1i ,O1i ), (I2i ,O2i ) . . .
(Ilii ,O
li
i )〉. Each pair (I ji ,O ji ) in the list describes one possible safe (hidden) solution for mi: I ji ⊆ Ii (resp. O ji ⊆ Oi) is
the set of input (output) attributes of mi to be hidden in this solution. li (the length of the list) is the number of solutions
for mi that are given in the list, and we use below `max to denote the length of the longest list, i.e. `max = maxni=1 `i.
When the input to the Secure-View problem is given in the above form (with the candidate attribute sets listed
explicitly) we call it the Secure-View problem with set constraints.
Cardinality constraints. Some modules may have many possible candidate safe attribute sets. Indeed, their number
may be exponential in the number of attributes of the module. This is illustrate by the following two simple examples.
Example 6. First observe that in any one-one function with k boolean inputs and k boolean outputs, hiding any k
incoming or any k outgoing attributes guarantees 2k-privacy. Thus listing all such subsets requires a list of length
Ω(
(2k
k
)
) = Ω(2k). Another example is majority function which takes 2k boolean inputs and produces 1 if and only if
the number of one-s in the input tuple is≥ k. Hiding either k+1 input bits or the unique output bit guarantee 2-privacy
for majority function, but explicitly listing all possible subsets again leads to exponential length lists.
Note that, in both examples, the actual identity of the hidden input (resp. output) attributes is not important, as
long as sufficiently many are hidden. Thus rather than explicitly listing all possible safe sets we could simply say what
combinations of numbers of hidden input and output attributes are safe. This motivates the following variant of the
Secure-View problem, called the Secure-View problem with cardinality constraints: Here for every module mi
we are given a list of pairs of numbers Li = 〈(α1i ,β 1i ) . . .(α lii ,β lii )〉, s.t. for each pair (α ji ,β ji ) in the list, α ji ≤ |Ii| and
β ji ≤ |Oi|. The interpretation is that hiding any attribute set of mi that consists of at least α ji input attributes and at
least β ji output attributes, for some j ∈ [1, `i], makes mi safe w.r.t the remaining visible attributes.
To continue with the above example, the list for the first module may consists of (k,0) and (0,k), whereas the list
for the second module consists of (k+1,0) and (0,1).
It is easy to see that, for cardinality constraints, the lists are of size at most quadratic in the number of attributes
of the given module (unlike the case of set constraints where the lists could be of exponential length)5. In turn, cardi-
nality constraints are less expressive than set constraints that can specify arbitrary attribute sets. This will affect the
complexity of the corresponding Secure-View problems.
Problem Statement. Given an input in one of the two forms, a feasible safe subset V for the workflow, for the
version with set constraints (resp. cardinality constraints), is such that for each module mi i ∈ [1,n], V ⊇ (I ji ∪O ji )
(resp. |V ∩ Ii| ≥ α ji and |V ∩Oi| ≥ β ji ) for some j ∈ [1, `i]. The goal of the Secure-View problem is to find a safe
set V where c(V ) is minimized.
5In fact, if one assumes that there is no redundancy in the list, the lists become of at most of linear size.
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4.3 Complexity results
We present below theorems which give approximation algorithms and matching hardness of approximation results of
different versions of the Secure-View problem. The hardness results show that the problem of testing whether the
Secure-View problem (in both variants) has a solution with cost smaller than a given bound is NP-hard even in the
most restricted case. But we show that certain approximations of the optimal solution are possible. Theorem 5 and
6 summarize the results for the cardinality and set constraints versions, respectively. For space constraints we only
sketch the proofs (full details appear in Appendix B).
Theorem 5. (Cardinality Constraints) There is an O(logn)-approximation of the Secure-View problem with
cardinality constraints. Further, this problem is Ω(logn)-hard to approximate unless NP ⊆ DTIME(nO(log logn)), even
if the maximum list size `max = 1, each data has unit cost, and the values of α ji ,β
j
i -s are 0 or 1.
Proof sketch. The proof of the hardness result in the above theorem is by a reduction from the set cover problem. The
approximation is obtained by randomized rounding a carefully written linear program (LP) relaxation of this problem.
A sketch is given below.
Our algorithm is based on rounding the fractional relaxation (called the LP relaxation) of the integer linear program
(IP) for this problem presented in Figure 3.
Minimize ∑b∈A cbxb subject to
`i
∑
j=1
ri j ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ [1,n] (1)
∑
b∈Ii
ybi j ≥ ri jα ji ∀i ∈ [1,n], ∀ j ∈ [1, `i] (2)
∑
b∈Oi
zbi j ≥ ri jβ ji ∀i ∈ [1,n], ∀ j ∈ [1, `i] (3)
`i
∑
j=1
ybi j ≤ xb, ∀i ∈ [1,n],∀b ∈ Ii (4)
`i
∑
j=1
zbi j ≤ xb, ∀i ∈ [1,n],∀b ∈ Oi (5)
ybi j ≤ ri j, ∀i ∈ [1,n], ∀ j ∈ [1, `i], ∀b ∈ Ii
(6)
zbi j ≤ ri j, ∀i ∈ [1,n], ∀ j ∈ [1, `i], ∀b ∈ Oi
(7)
xb,ri j,ybi j,zbi j ∈ {0,1} (8)
Figure 3: IP for Secure-View with cardinality constraints
Recall that each module mi has a list Li = {(α ji ,β ji ) : j ∈ [1, `i]}, a feasible solution must ensure that for each
i ∈ [1,n], there exists a j ∈ [1, `i] such that at least α ji input data and β ji output data of mi are hidden.
In this IP, xb = 1 if data b is hidden, and ri j = 1 if at least α
j
i input data and β
j
i output data of module mi are hidden.
Then, ybi j = 1 (resp., zbi j = 1) if both ri j = 1 and xb = 1, i.e. if data b contributes to satisfying the input requirement α
j
i
(resp., output requirement β ji ) of module mi. Let us first verify that the IP indeed solves the Secure-View problem
with cardinality constraints. For each module mi, constraint (1) ensures that for some j ∈ [1, `i], ri j = 1. In conjunction
with constraints (2) and (3), this ensures that for some j ∈ [1, `i], (i) at least α ji input data of mi have ybi j = 1 and (ii)
at least β ji output data of mi have zbi j = 1. But, constraint (4) (resp., constraint (5)) requires that whenever ybi j = 1
(resp., zbi j = 1), data b be hidden, i.e. xb = 1, and a cost of cb be added to the objective. Thus the set of hidden
data satisfy the privacy requirement of each module mi and the value of the objective is the cost of the hidden data.
Note that constraints (6) and (7) are also satisfied since ybi j and zbi j are 0 whenever ri j = 0. Thus, the IP represents
the Secure-View problem with cardinality constraints. In Appendix B.4 we show that simpler LP relaxations of
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this problem without some of the above constraints lead to unbounded and Ω(n) integrality gaps showing that an
O(logn)-approximation cannot be obtained from those simpler LP relaxations.
We round the fractional solution to the LP relaxation using Algorithm 1. For each j ∈ [1, `i], let Imini j and Omini j be
the α ji input and β
j
i output data of mi with minimum cost. Then, B
min
i represents I
min
i j ∪Omini j of minimum cost.
Algorithm 1 Rounding algorithm of LP relaxation of the IP given in Figure 3,
Input: An optimal fractional solution {xb|b ∈ A},
Output: A safe subset V for Γ-privacy of W .
1: Initialize B = φ .
2: For each attribute b ∈ A (A is the set of all attributes in W ), include b in B with probability min{1,16xb logn}.
3: For each module mi whose privacy requirement is not satisfied by B, add Bmini to B.
4: Return V = A\B as the safe visible attribute.
The following lemma shows that step 2 satisfies the privacy requirement of each module with high probability:
Lemma 3. Let mi be any module in workflow W. Then with probability at least 1−2/n2, there exists a j ∈ [1, `i] such
that |Ihi | ≥ α ji and |Ohi | ≥ β ji .
Proof sketch. The LP solution returns a probability distribution on ri j, and therefore on the pairs in list Li. Let p be
the index of the median of this distribution when list Li is ordered by both α ji and β
j
i values, as described above. Our
proof consists of showing that with probability ≥ 1−2/n2, |Ihi | ≥ αip and |Ohi | ≥ βip.
Note that since p is the median, the sum of ybi j over all incoming data of module vi in the LP solution must be
at least αip/2 (from constraint (2)). Further, constraint (6) ensures that this sum is contributed to by at least αip/2
different input data, and constraint (4) ensures that xb for any input data b must be at least its contribution to this
sum, i.e. ∑ j ybi j. Thus, at least αip/2 different input data have a large enough value of xb, and randomized rounding
produces a good solution. An identical argument works for the output data of mi (details in the appendix).
Since the above lemma holds for every module, by standard arguments, the O(logn)-approximation follows.
We next show that the richer expressiveness of set constraints increases the complexity of the problem.
Theorem 6. (Set Constraints) The Secure-View problem with set constraints cannot be approximated to within
a factor of `εmax for some constant ε > 0 (also within a factor of Ω(2log
1−γ n) for all constant γ > 0) unless NP ⊆
DTIME(npolylog n). The hardness result holds even when the maximum list size `max is a (sufficiently large) constant,
each data has unit cost, and the subsets I ji ,O
j
i -s have cardinality at most 2. Finally, it is possible to get a factor
`max-approximation in polynomial time.
Proof sketch. When we are allowed to specify arbitrary subsets for individual modules, we can encode a hard problem
like label-cover which is known to have no poly-logarithmic approximation given standard complexity assumptions.
The corresponding approximation is obtained by an LP rounding algorithm which shows that a good approximation
is still possible when the number of specified subsets for individual modules is not too large. Details can be found by
Appendix B.5.
The hardness proofs in the above two theorems use extensively data sharing, namely the fact that an output attribute
of a given module may be fed as input to several other modules. Recall that a workflow is said to have γ-bounded data
sharing if the maximum number of modules which takes a particular data item as input is bounded by γ . In real life
workflows, the number of modules where a data item is sent is not very large. The following theorem shows that a
better approximation is possible when this number is bounded.
Theorem 7. (Bounded Data Sharing) There is a (γ+1)-approximation algorithm for the Secure-View problem
(with both cardinality and set constraints) when the workflow has γ-bounded data sharing. On the other hand, the
cardinality constraint version (and consequently also the set constraint version) of the problem remain APX-hard even
when there is no data sharing (i.e. γ = 1), each data has unit cost, the maximum list size `max is 2, and the values of
α ji ,β
j
i -s are bounded by 3.
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Proof sketch. The APX-hardness in the above theorem is obtained by a reduction from vertex-cover in cubic graphs.
This reduction also shows that the NP-completeness of this problem does not originate from data-sharing, and the
problem is unlikely to have an exact solution even without any data sharing. The γ + 1-approximation is obtained
by a greedy algorithm, which chooses the least cost attribute subsets for individual modules, and outputs the union
of all of them. Since any attribute is produced by a unique module and is fed to at most γ modules, in any optimal
solution, a single attribute can be used to satisfy the requirement of at most γ + 1 modules. This gives a γ + 1-
approximation. Observe that when data sharing is not bounded, γ can be Ω(n) and this greedy algorithm will not give
a good approximation to this problem.
5 Public Modules
In the previous section we restricted our attention to workflows where all modules are private. In practice, typical
workflows use also public modules. Not surprisingly, this makes privacy harder to accomplish. In particular, we will
see below that it becomes harder to assemble privacy guarantees for the full workflow out of those that suffice for
component modules. Nevertheless a refined variant of Theorem 4 can still be employed.
5.1 Standalone vs. Workflow Privacy (Revisited)
We have shown in Section 4.1 (Theorem 4) that when a set of hidden attributes guarantees Γ-standalone-privacy for a
private module, then the same set of attributes can be used to guarantee Γ-workflow-privacy in an all-private network.
Interestingly, this is no longer the case for workflows with public modules. To see why, consider the following
example.
Example 7. Consider a private module m implementing a one-one function with k boolean inputs and k boolean
outputs. Hiding any logΓ input attributes guarantees Γ-standalone-privacy for m even if all output attributes of m
are visible. However, if m gets all its inputs from a public module m′ that computes some constant function (i.e.
∀x,m′(x) = a, for some constant a), then hiding logΓ input attributes no longer guarantees Γ-workflow-privacy of m
– this is because it suffices to look at the (visible) output attributes of m to know the value m(x) for x = a.
In an analogous manner, hiding any logΓ output attributes of m, leaving all its input attributes visible, also
guarantees Γ-standalone-privacy of m. But if m sends all its outputs to another public module m′′ that implements a
one-one invertible function, and whose output attributes happen to be visible, then for any input x to m, m(x) can be
immediately inferred using the inverse function of m′′.
Modules that compute a constant function (or even one-one invertible function) may not be common in practice.
However, this simple example illustrates where, more generally, the proof of Theorem 4 (or Lemma 1) fails in the
presence of public modules: when searching for a possible world that is consistent with the visible attributes, one
needs to ensure that the functions defined by the public modules remain unchanged. So we no longer have the freedom
of freely changing the values of the hidden input (resp. output) attributes, if those are supplied by (to) a public module.
One way to overcome this problem is to “privatize” such problematic public modules, in the sense that the name
of the public module is not revealed to users (either in the workflow specification or in its execution logs). Here we
assume that once we rename a module the user loses all knowledge about it (we discuss other possible approaches in
the conclusion). We refer to the public modules whose identity is hidden (resp. revealed) as hidden (visible) public
modules. Observe that now, since the identity of the hidden modules is no longer known to the adversary, condition
(2) in Definition 4 no longer needs to be enforced for them, and a larger set of possible words can be considered.
Formally,
Definition 6. (Definition 4 revisited) Let P be a subset of the public modules, and, as before, let V be a set of the visible
attributes. Then, the set of possible worlds for the relation R w.r.t. V and P, denoted Worlds(R,V,P), consists of all
relations R′ over the same attributes as R that satisfy the functional dependencies in F and where (1) piV (R′) = piV (R),
and (2) for every public module mi ∈ P and every tuple t′ ∈ R′, piOi(t′) = mi(piIi(t′)).
The notion of Γ-privacy for a workflow W , with both private and public modules (w.r.t a set V of visible attributes
and a set P of visible public modules) is now defined as before (Definition 5), except that the set of possible worlds
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that is considered is the refined one from Definition 6 above. Similarly, if W is Γ-private w.r.t. V and P, then we will
call the pair (V,P) a safe subset for Γ-privacy of W .
We can now show that, by making visible only public modules whose input and output attribute values need not be
masked, one can obtain a result analogous to Theorem 4. Namely, assemble the privacy guarantees of the individual
modules to form privacy guarantees for the full workflow. Wlog., we will assume that m1,m2, · · · ,mK are the private
modules and mK+1, · · · ,mn are the public modules in W .
Theorem 8. Given a parameter Γ≥ 1, let Vi ⊆ (Ii∪Oi), i ∈ [1,K], be a set of visible attributes w.r.t which the private
module mi is Γ-standalone-private. Then the workflow W is Γ-private w.r.t the set of visible attributes V and any set
of visible public modules P⊆ {mK+1, · · · ,mn}, s.t. V =⋃Ki=1 Vi and all the input and output attributes of modules in P
are visible and belong to V .
Proof sketch. The proof is similar to that of Thm. 4. Here we additionally show in a lemma analogous to Lemma 1
(see Lemma 7 in Appendix C.1) that, if a public module m j, j ∈ [K + 1,n] is redefined to g j, then m j is hidden. In
other words, the visible public modules in P are never redefined and therefore condition (2) in Definition 6 holds.
Example 8. Consider a chain workflow with three modules m′→ m→ m′′, where m′ is a public module computing a
constant function, m is a private module computing a one-one function and m′′ is another public module computing an
invertible one-one function. If we hide only a subset of the input attributes of m, m′ should be hidden, thus P = {m′′}.
Similarly, if we hide only a subset of the output attributes of m, m′′ should be hidden. Finally, if we hide a combination
of input and output attributes, both m′,m′′ should be hidden and in that case P = φ .
5.2 The Secure-View Problem (Revisited)
The Secure-View optimization problem in general workflows is similar to the case of all-private workflows, with an
additional cost due to hiding (privatization) of public modules: when a public module m j is hidden, the solution incurs
a cost c(m j). Following the notation of visible and hidden attributes, V and V , we will denote the set of hidden public
modules by P. The total cost due to hidden public modules is c(P) =∑m j∈P c(m j), and the total cost of a safe solution
(V,P) is c(V )+c(P). The definition of the Secure-View problem, with cardinality and set constraints, naturally
extends to this refined cost function and the goal is to find a safe solution with minimum cost. This generalizes the
Secure-View problem for all-private workflows where P = φ (and hence c(P) = 0).
Complexity Results (details in Appendix C). In Section 4.3 we showed that the Secure-View problem has an
O(logn)-approximation in an all-private workflow even when the lists specifying cardinality requirements are Ω(n)-
long and when the workflow has arbitrary data sharing. But, we show (in Appendix C.4) by a reduction from the
label-cover problem that the cardinality constraints version in general workflows is Ω(2log1−γ n)-hard to approximate
(for all constant γ > 0), and thus unlikely to have any polylogarithmic-approximation. In contrast, the approximation
factor for the set constraints version remains the same and Theorem 6 still holds for general workflows by a simple
modification to the proof. However, γ-bounded data sharing no longer give a constant factor approximation any more
for a constant value of γ . By a reduction from the set-cover problem, we prove in Appendix C.2 that the problem
is Ω(logn)-hard to approximate even when the workflow has no data sharing, and when the maximum size of the
requirement lists and the individual cardinality requirements in them are bounded by 1.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes the use of provenance views for preserving the privacy of module functionality in a workflow.
Our model motivates a natural optimization problem, Secure-View , which seeks to identify the smallest amount of
data that needs to be hidden so that the functionality of every module is kept private. We give algorithms and hardness
results that characterize the complexity of the problem.
In our analysis, we assume that users have two sources of knowledge about module functionality: the module
name (identity) and the visible part of the workflow relation. Module names are informative for public modules, but
the information is lost once the module name is hidden/renamed. Names of private modules are non-informative, and
16
users know only what is given in the workflow view. However, if users have some additional prior knowledge about
the behavior of a private module, we may hide their identity by renaming them, and then run our algorithms.
Our work suggests several promising directions for future research. First, a finer privacy analysis may be possible
if one knows what kind of prior knowledge the user has on a private module, e.g. the distribution of output values for a
specific input value, or knowledge about the types and names of input/output attributes (certain integers may be illegal
social security numbers, certain character sequences are more likely to represent gene sequences than others, etc). Our
definitions and algorithms currently assume that all data values in an attribute domain are equally possible, so the effect
of knowledge of a possibly non-uniform prior distribution on input/output values should be explored. Second, some
additional sources of user knowledge on functionality of public modules (e.g. types of attributes and connection with
other modules) may prohibit hiding their functionality using privatization (renaming), and we would like to explore
alternatives to privatization to handle public modules. A third direction to explore is an alternative model of privacy.
As previously mentioned, standard mechanisms to guarantee differential privacy (e.g. adding random noise to data
values) do not seem to work for ensuring module privacy w.r.t. provenance queries, and new mechanisms suitable to
our application have to be developed. Other natural directions for future research include considering non-additive
cost functions, in which some attribute subsets are more useful than others, efficiently handling infinite or very large
domains of attributes, and exploring alternate objective functions, such as maximizing utility of visible data instead of
minimizing the cost of hidden data.
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A Proofs from Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove the theorem by a communication complexity reduction from the set disjointness problem: Suppose
Alice and Bob own two subsets A and B of a universe U , |U | = N. To decide whether they have a common element
(i.e. A∩B 6= φ ) takes Ω(N) communications [19].
We construct the following relation R with N+1 rows for the module m. m has three input attributes: a,b, id and
one output attribute y. The attributes a,b and y are boolean, whereas id is in the range [1,N+1]. The input attribute id
denotes the identity of every row in R and takes value i ∈ [1,N+1] for the i-th row. The module m computes the AND
function of inputs a and b, i.e., y = a∧b.
Row i, i ∈ [1,N], corresponds to element i ∈U . In row i, value of a is 1 iff i ∈ A; similarly, value of b is 1 iff i ∈ B.
The additional N+1-th row has aN+1 = 1 and bN+1 = 0. The standalone privacy requirement Γ= 2 and the goal is to
check if visible attributes V = {id,y} (with hidden attributes V = {a,b}) is safe for this privacy requirement.
Note that if there is a common element i ∈ A∩B, then there are two y values in the table: in the i-th row, the value
of y= a∧b will be 1, whereas, in the N+1-th row it is 0. Hence hiding V = {a,b} will ensure the privacy requirement
of Γ = 2 (every input x to m can be mapped either to 0 or 1). If there is no such i ∈ A∩B, the value of y in all rows
i ∈ [1,N+1] will be zero which does not meet the privacy requirement Γ= 2. Hence we need to look at Ω(N) rows to
decide whether V = {id,y} is safe.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In our reduction, N = 2k−1. Hence, alternatively, if N is the number of tuples in the relation, there does not exists
a poly(logN) algorithm, unless P = NP.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a reduction from UNSAT: Suppose we are given a boolean CNF formula g on `
boolean variables x1, · · · ,x`. The goal is to decide if no assignment of x1, · · · ,x` can satisfy g. Given such an UNSAT
instance, we build a relation R with input attributes x1, · · · ,x`,y and output attribute z, all of boolean domain (hence
k = `+2).
The function of m has a succinct description as follows: m(x1, · · · ,x`,y) = ¬g(x1, · · · ,x`)∧¬y (i.e., NOR of
g(x1, · · · ,x`) and y). Hence in the table R, implicitly, we have two tuples for each assignment to the variables, x1, · · · ,x`:
if the assignment for x1, · · · ,x` satisfies the formula g then, for both y = 0 and y = 1, we have z = 0. Otherwise if
the assignment does not satisfy the formula, for y = 0, we have z = 1, and for y = 1, z = 0. The privacy requirement
is Γ = 2 and the goal is to decide if visible attributes V = {x1, · · · ,x`}∪{z} is a safe subset where hidden attributes
V = {y}.
Note that if the formula g is not satisfiable, then it suffices to hide y to get 2-privacy, i.e. V is safe. This is
because for every satisfying assignment, there are two ways to complete y value (one that is the correct one and one
that is the opposite). On the other hand, if the function g has at least one satisfying assignment, for that assignment
in R,regardless of the value of the hidden attribute y, the output z has to always be 0. In that case V is not a safe
subset.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that an algorithm ALGO exists which uses 2o(k) oracle calls. We will
build an adversary that controls the Safe-View oracle and outputs answers to the queries consistent with a fixed
function m1 and a dynamically changing function m2 that depends on the set of queries asked. The minimum cost of
a safe subset for m1 will be 3/2 times that for (all definitions of) m2, thereby proving the theorem.
Consider a function with ` boolean input attributes in I, and one output attribute in O where ` is even (i.e. k= `+1).
The costs of all attributes in I is 1, the cost of attribute y in O is `. We want to decide whether there exists a safe visible
subset V such that the cost of the hidden subset V is at most C = `2 , or all hidden subsets have cost at least
3C
2 =
3`
4 .
Hence, any such set V can never include the output attribute.
The oracle behaves as follows:
19
(P1) The oracle answers YES for every set V of input attributes s.t. |V |< `4 (i.e. |V |> 3`4 ), and
(P2) The oracle answers NO for every subset V of input attributes s.t. |V | ≥ `4 (i.e. |V | ≤ 3`4 ).
The functions m1 and m2 are defined as follows:
• m1 returns 1 iff the total number of input attributes whose value is 1 is at least `4 (and otherwise 0),
• m2 has a special set A such that |A|= `2 . It returns 1 iff the total number of input attributes whose value is 1 is at
least `4 and there is at least one input attribute outside A whose value is 1 (and otherwise 0).
Note that while the cheapest safe subset for m1 has cost greater than 3`4 , m2 has a safe subset A where the cost of A is
`
2 .
It remains to show that the behavior of the oracle (i.e. properties (P1) and (P2)) remains consistent with the
definitions of m1 and m2. We consider m1 first.
• (P1) holds for m1: An all-0 V and an all-1 V respectively imply an answer of 0 and 1 independent of the
assignment of V .
• (P2) holds for m1: An all-1 V implies an answer of 1 independent of the assignment of V .
Now, we consider m2.
• (P1) holds for m2: An all-0 V and an all-1 V respectively imply an answer of 0 and 1 independent of the
assignment of V or the definition of A (in the first case, number of 1 is < `4 and in the second case the number
of 1 is ≥ 3`4 > `4 and there is one 1 outside A since 3`4 > `2 ).
• (P2) holds for m2 as long as V is not a subset of A, since an all-1 V will imply an answer of 1 independent of
the assignment of V . Therefore, such a query restricts the possible candidates of A, and discards at most
(3`/4
`/4
)
candidates of A.
Since there are
( `
`/2
)
possible definitions of A overall, the number of queries required to certify the absence of A
(i.e. certify that the function is indeed m1 and not m2 with some definition of A) is at least( `
`/2
)(3`/4
`/4
) = `/2−1∏
i=0
`− i
3`/4− i ≥ (4/3)
`/2 = 2Ω(k).
Therefore, for a 2o(k)-restricted algorithm ALGO , there always remains at least one subset A defining a function
m2 that is consistent with all previous answers to queries. Hence after 2o(k) calls, if the algorithm decides that there
is a safe subset with cost < C, we choose m to be m1; on the other hand, if it says that there is no such subset, we
set m = m2 (with the remaining consistent subset of size `2 as its special subset A). In both the cases the answer of
the algorithm is wrong which shows that there cannot be such an algorithm distinguishing these two cases with 2o(k)
calls.
Remark. The above construction also shows that given a cost limit C, deciding whether there exists a safe subset V
with cost at most C or all safe subsets have cost at least 3C2 requires 2
Ω(k) oracle calls. By adjusting the parameters in
this construction, the gap can be increased to a factor of Ω(k1/3) from a constant. More specifically, it can be shown
that deciding whether there exists a safe subset with cost at most C, or whether for all safe subsets the cost is at least
Ω(k1/3C) requires 2Ω(k1/6) calls to the Safe-View oracle.
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A.4 Upper Bounds for Standalone Privacy
The lower bounds in Section 3.1 show that it is unlikely to have optimal algorithms for the standalone Secure-View prob-
lem with time complexity sub-exponential in k and sub-linear in N. Here we show that the naive algorithms for solving
the Secure-View problem have time complexity polynomial in N and exponential in k. It is important to note that
the following upper bounds also hold if our goal is to output all safe subsets instead of deciding whether there exists
one within a cost limit. This will be useful in Section 4 and Section 5 to guarantee workflow-privacy of private mod-
ules where we will try to minimize the total cost of hidden attributes in the workflow efficiently combining different
options of hidden attributes that guarantee standalone-privacy for the individual private modules.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to find the minimum cost safe subset for a standalone module
1: for every subset V of I∪O such that c(V )≤C do
2: for every assignment of the visible input attributes in I∩V do
3: check if assignments of the hidden input attributes in I \V lead to at least Γ∏a∈O\V |∆a| different values of the
visible output attributes in O∩V (∆a is the domain of attribute a)
4: end for
5: end for
6: Output the subset V having minimum cost c(V ) satisfying the above condition.
Let us first consider the Secure-View problem with a Safe-View oracle. Since there are at most 2k possible
subsets of attributes V ⊆ I∪O (k = |I|+ |O|), clearly 2k calls to the Safe-View oracle suffice to find a safe subset V
with minimum cost of V . showed in Theorem 3. Hence with a Safe-View oracle, the Secure-View problem has
O(2k) both communication and computation complexity.
Next consider the upper bounds without a Safe-View oracle. Clearly N calls to the data supplier suffices to read
the entire relation R. So we discuss standard computation complexity of the problem once the relation R is available
(either by calls from the data supplier or from a succinct representation). Algorithm 2 gives a simple algorithm to obtain
a safe subset with minimum cost. The following lemma proves the correctness and time complexity of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 2 finds the optimal solution to the Safe-View problem when the relation R of the module is
given and runs in time O(2kN2) where k and N are the number of attributes and the number of tuples in R respectively.
Proof. First we prove the correctness of Algorithm 2. When a subset V ⊆ I∪O satisfies the condition, each of these
outputs can be extended to ∏a∈O\V |∆a| different outputs by all possible assignments of the hidden output attributes
in ∏a∈O\V . Together, this leads to Γ different outputs for every assignment of the input attributes in I. The algorithm
returns the minimum cost subset among all subsets which are safe, and therefore returns the optimal solution.
Next we prove the time complexity. Recall that δ = maxa∈I∪O |∆a| denotes the maximum domain size of any
attribute. The number of different visible subsets V of I ∪O is 2k. There are at most δ |I∩V | different assignments
of I ∩V , but the relation R with N tuples can have at most N of them. For each such assignment, there are at most
δ |I\V | assignments of I \V . However, to collect these outputs, we may need to scan the entire table which may take
O(N) time. Computing and checking whether the visible output attributes give Γ∏a∈O\V |∆a| different values take time
polynomial in k. Hence total time complexity is O(2kN2).
The above algorithm can be implemented by standard SQL queries by going over all possible subsets of attributes
V , using a “GROUP BY” query on I∩V , and then checking if “COUNT” of every resulting tuples lead to the specified
number.
This also shows that access to a Safe-View oracle can improve the time complexity significantly (2k oracle
calls suffice). The correctness of the algorithm proved in the above theorem can be illustrated with Figure 1d. Here
I = {a1,a2}, O = {a3,a4,a5} and V = {a1,a3,a5}. Consider assignment 0 to the visible input attribute a1 in I ∩V .
The assignment of 0 to hidden input attribute a2 ∈ I \V gives value (0,1) to visible output attributes a3,a5 in O∩V ,
whereas the assignment of 1 to a2 gives (1,0). For Γ= 4, we have Γ|∆a2 |
= 42 = 2 different values of the visible output
attributes a3,a5 (here |∆a2 | = |{0,1}| = 2). Each of these outputs can be extended to two different values by 0 and 1
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assignment of the hidden output attribute a4 in O\V . Hence each input (0,0) and (0,1) can be mapped to one of the
four values (0,1,0),(0,1,1),(1,1,0) and (1,1,1). The same can be verified for an assignment of 1 to the visible input
attribute a1 as well.
B Proofs from Section 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We construct a simple workflow with two modules m1,m2 joined back to back as a chain. Both m1,m2 are one-one
functions with k boolean inputs and k boolean outputs (for example, assume that m1 is an identity function, whereas
m2 reverses the values of its k inputs). The module m1 gets initial input attribute set I1, produces O1 = I2 which is
fed to the module m2 as input, and m2 produces final attribute set O2. Let V1 be an arbitrary subset of O1 such that
|V1|= logΓ (for simplicity, we assume that Γ is a power of 2). It can be easily verified that, m1 as a standalone module
is Γ-standalone-private w.r.t. visible attributes V1 and both m1,m2 are Γ-workflow-private w.r.t. visible attributes V1
(since m1,m2 are one-one modules).
Next we discuss how the one-one nature of m1 and m2 restricts the size of Worlds(R,V1) compared to that of
Worlds(R1,V1). Since both m1 and m2 are one-one functions, the workflow W also computes a one-one function.
Hence any relation S in Worlds(R,V1) has to compute a one-one function as well. But when m1 was standalone,
any This in turn implies that the projection piI1∪O1(S) on I1 ∪O1 for any such relation S has to be one-one as well,
otherwise S cannot compute a one-one function (S has to satisfy the functional dependencies I1→ O1 and I2→ O2).
However, both I1 and O2 are visible and S ∈ Worlds(R,V1), i.e., piV1(S) = piV1(R). Therefore fixing the attribute
values in piI1∪O1(S) also fixes the relation S. Hence the number of relations in Worlds(R,V1) is exactly the same
as the number of relations S′ over I1 ∪O1 such that (1) S′ computes a one-one function from I1 to O1, and, (2)
pi(I1∪O1)∩V1(S
′) = pi(I1∪O1)∩V1(R1). On the other hand, Worlds(R1,V1) will be all possible relations S
′ on Ii ∪Oi such
that only (2) holds.
Let us first exactly compute |Worlds(R1,V1)|. Given an input to m1, the visible output bits in V1 are fixed; however,
the hidden output bits in V1 can have arbitrary values. Since |V1| = logΓ, any input to m1 can be mapped to one of Γ
different outputs. There are 2k different inputs to m1, and any relation S′ ∈ Worlds(R1,V1) is an arbitrary combination
of the mappings for individual inputs. Hence |Worlds(R1,V1)|= Γ2k .
Next we compute |Worlds(R,V1)| which is the same as the number of one-one mappings for the module m1 with
the same values of the visible bits. Let us partition the set of 2k different values of initial inputs to m1 into 2k/Γ
groups, where all Γ initial inputs in a group produce the same values of visible intermediate attributes V1. Any relation
S ∈ Worlds(R1,V1) has to map the input tuples in each such group to Γ distinct intermediate tuples. Hence S must
permute the Γ intermediate tuples corresponding to a group of Γ input tuples.
Thus, the total number of relations in Worlds(R,V1) is (Γ!)2
k/Γ ' ((2piΓ)1/2Γ(Γ/e))2k by Stirling’s approximation
(the input tuples in a group can map to one of Γ! permutations, there are 2k/Γ groups which can map independently).
Hence the ratio of |Worlds(R,V1)| and |Worlds(R1,V1)| is
(
(2piΓ)1/2Γ
e
)2k
< 1.4−2k for any Γ≥ 2 6.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If y ∈ OUTx,mi w.r.t. visible attributes Vi, then from Definition 2,
∃R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Vi), ∃t ′ ∈ R′ s.t x = piIi(t′)∧y = piOi(t′) (9)
Further, from Definition 1, R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Vi) only if piVi(Ri) = piVi(R′). Hence there must exist a tuple t ∈ Ri such
that
piVi(t) = piVi(t
′) (10)
Let x′ = piIi(t′) and y′ = piOi(t′), i.e. y′ = mi(x′). Then by definition of x,y,x′,y′ and from (10), piVi∩Ii(x) = piVi∩Ii(x′)
and piV∩Oi(y) = piV∩Oi(y′).
6For x> 1, x1/x is a decreasing function and e
(pix)1/x
≥ 1.4
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
First we introduce some additional notations. Recall that the relation R for workflow W is defined on the attribute set
(or vector) A. For a tuple x, we will use x(Q) to denote that the tuple x is defined on the attribute subset Q⊆ A; For an
attribute a ∈ Q, x[a] will denote the value of the attribute a in x, i.e. x[a] = pia(x).
Let x(P) be a tuple defined on an arbitrary attribute subset P⊆ A and p(Q),q(Q) be two tuples defined on another
arbitrary subset Q⊆ A. Then, the tuple y = FLIPp,q(x) defined on attribute subset P is defined as
y[a] =
 q[a] if a ∈ Q and x[a] = p[a]p[a] if a ∈ Q and x[a] = q[a]x[a] otherwise.
Intuitively, if the input tuple x shares the same value of some common attribute a ∈ P∩Q with that of p (i.e. x[a] =
p[a]), the flip operation replaces the attribute value x[a] by q[a] in x, whereas, if x[a] = q[a], it replaces the value x[a] by
p[a]. If a ∈ P\Q, or, if for some a ∈ P∩Q, x[a] 6= p[a] and x[a] 6= q[a], x[a] remains unchanged. If x[a] = p[a] = q[a],
then also the value of x[a] remains unchanged.
It is easy to see that FLIPp,q(FLIPp,q(x)) = x. In the proof of the lemma, we will also use the notion of function
flipping, which first flips the input on p,q, then applies the function on the flipped input, and then flips the output again
on p,q. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 7. Consider a module m mapping attributes in I to attributes in O. Let p(P),q(P) be two tuples defined on
attribute subset P⊆ A. Then, ∀x(X) defined on X, FLIPm,p,q(x) = FLIPp,q(m(FLIPp,q(x))).
Now we complete the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. If a module mi is Γ-workflow-private w.r.t. visible attributes Vi, then from Proposition 1, mi is also Γ-workflow-
private w.r.t. any V ′i ⊆Vi (or equivalently, V ′i ⊇Vi). Hence we will prove Lemma 1 for V =Vi.
Consider module mi with relation Ri, input tuple x and visible attribute subset Vi as stated in Lemma 1. Let
y ∈ OUTx,mi . We will prove y ∈ OUTx,W , by showing the existence of a relation R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ) and a tuple t′ ∈ R′
such that x = piIi(t′)∧y = piOi(t′) (ref. Definition 5).
Since y ∈ OUTx,mi , by Lemma 2, there are x′ ∈ piVi∩Ii(Ri), y′ = mi(x′) such that
piVi∩Ii(x) = piVi∩Ii(x
′),piVi∩Oi(y) = piVi∩Oi(y
′) (11)
Let p(Ii∪Oi),q(Ii∪Oi) be two tuples on Ii∪Oi where
p[`] =
{
x[`] if ` ∈ Ii
y[`] if ` ∈ Oi and q[`] =
{
x′[`] if ` ∈ Ii
y′[`] if ` ∈ Oi.
(Recall that Ii ∩Oi = φ ). Hence FLIPp,q(x′) = x and FLIPp,q(y′) = y. It should be notes that x,x′ and y,y′ have the
same values on visible attribute subsets Ii∩V and Oi∩V respectively. So p and q only differ on the hidden attributes.
Therefore, for any two tuples w,z, if FLIPp,q(w) = z, then w and z will also only differ on the hidden attributes and
their visible attribute values are the same.
For each j∈ [1,n], we define g j = FLIPm j ,p,q. Then the desired relation R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ) is obtained by collecting
executions of the workflow where every module mi is replaced by module gi, i ∈ [1,n]. So we need to show that (i)
there is a tuple t ∈ S, such that piIi(t) = x and piOi(t) = y, and, (ii) R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ).
(i): To show the existence of such a tuple t ∈ R′, it suffices to show that gi(x) = y, since then for any tuple
t ∈ R′, if piIi(t) = x, then piOi(t) = y. We claim that gi maps x to y as desired. This holds since gi(x) = FLIPmi,p,q(x)
= FLIPp,q(mi(FLIPp,q(x))) = FLIPp,q(mi(x′)) = FLIPp,q(y′) = y.
(ii): Since every g j is a function, R′ satisfies all functional dependencies Ii → Oi, i ∈ [1,n]. Hence to prove
R′ ∈ Worlds(R,V ), it suffices to show that, for the same initial inputs in R and R′, the values of all the visible attributes
in R and R′ are the same. Let I0 be the set of initial inputs to workflow W . We need to show that for any two tuples
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t ∈ R and t′ ∈ R′ on attribute set A, if piI0(t) = piI0(t′), then t, t′ also have the same values on the visible attributes V ,
i.e., piV (t) = piV (t′).
Let us fix any arbitrary tuple p on input attributes I0. Let us assume, wlog., that the modules m1, · · · ,mn (and
corresponding g1, · · · ,gn) are ordered in a topological sorted order in the DAG W . Since I0 is essentially the key
attributes of relation R or R′, there are two unique tuples t ∈ R and t′ ∈ R′ such that piI0(t) = piI0(t′) = p. Note that any
intermediate or final attribute a ∈ A\ I0 belongs to O j, for a unique j ∈ [1,n] (since for j 6= `, O j ∩O` = φ ). We prove
by induction on j that the values of the visible attributes O j∩V are the same for t and t′ for every j. Together with the
fact that the values of the attributes in I0 are the same in t, t′, this shows that piV (t) = piV (t′).
Let cj,f,cj,g be the values of input attributes I j and dj,f,dj,g be the values of output attributes O j of module m j in
t∈R and t′ ∈R′ respectively on initial input attributes p (i.e. cj,f = piI j(t), cj,g = piI j(t′), dj,f = piO j(t) and dj,g = piO j(t′)).
Then, we prove that dj,g = FLIPp,q(dj,f).
From (11), x,x′, and y,y′ have the same values of the visible attributes. Therefore the tuples p and q only differ in
hidden attributes. Then if the above claim is true, for every j, dj,g and dj,f are the same on the visible attributes Oi∩V .
Equivalently, t and t′ have the same values of visible attributes V as desired.
Note that if the inductive hypothesis holds for all j′ < j, then cj,g = FLIPp,q(cj,f), since the modules are listed in a
topological order. Thus,
dj,g = g j(cj,g) = FLIPm j ,p,q(FLIPp,q(cj,f))
= FLIPp,q(m j(FLIPp,q(FLIPp,q(cj,f))))
= FLIPp,q(m j(cj,f)) = FLIPp,q(dj,f).
Hence the hypothesis dj,g = FLIPp,q(dj,f) also holds for module m j. This completes the proof of this lemma.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 5
In Secure-View problem with cardinality constraint, as stated in Section 4.2, every module mi, i ∈ [1,n], has a
requirement list of pair of numbers Li = {(α ji ,β ji ) : α ji ≤ |Ii|,β ji ≤ |Oi|, j ∈ [1, `i]}. The goal is to select a safe subset
of attributes V with minimum cost c(V ), such that for every i ∈ [1,n], at least α ji input attributes and β ji output
attributes of module mi are hidden for some j ∈ [1, `i].
In this section, we prove Theorem 5. First we give an O(logn)-approximation algorithm, and then show that this
problem is Ω(logn)-hard under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, even if the cost of hiding each data is
identical, and the requirement list of every module in the workflow contains exactly one pair of numbers with values
0 or 1.
B.4.1 O(logn)-Approximation Algorithm
Our algorithm is based on rounding the fractional relaxation (called the LP relaxation) of the integer linear program
(IP) for this problem presented in Figure 3.
One can write a simpler IP for this problem, where the summations are removed from constraints (4) and (5), and
constraints (6) and (7) are removed altogether. To see the necessity of these constraints, consider the LP relaxation of
the IP, obtained by replacing constraint (8) with xb,ri j,ybi j,zbi j ∈ [0,1].
Suppose constraints (6) and (7) were missing from the IP, and therefore from the LP as well. For a particular
i ∈ [1,n], it is possible that a fractional solution to the LP has ri j = 1/2 for two distinct values j1 and j2 of j, where
αi j1 > αi j2 and βi j1 < βi j2 . But constraint (2) (resp., constraint (3)) can now be satisfied by setting ybi j1 = ybi j2 = 1
(resp., zbi j1 = zbi j2 = 1) for αi j1/2 input data (resp., βi j2/2 output data). However, (αi j1/2,βi j2/2) might not satisfy the
privacy requirement for i, forcing an integral solution to hide some data b with xb = 0. This will lead to an unbounded
integrality gap.
Now, suppose constraints (2) and (3) did not have the summation. For a particular i ∈ [1,n], it is possible that
a fractional solution to the LP has ri j = 1/`i for all j ∈ [1, `i]. Constraint (2) (resp., constraint (3)) can then be
satisfied by setting ybi j = 1/`i for all 1 ≤ `i, for max j{α ji } distinct input data (resp., max j{β ji } distinct output data).
Correspondingly, xb = 1/`i for those data b. If all the α
j
i s and β
j
i s for different j ∈ [1, `i] have similar values, it would
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mean that we are satisfying the privacy constraint for mi paying an `i fraction of the cost of an integral solution. This
can be formalized to yield an integrality gap of maxi{`i}, which could be n. Introducing the summation in the LP
precludes this possibility.
Analysis. We can assume wlog that the requirement list Li for each module mi is non-redundant, i.e. for all
1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ `i, either αi j1 > αi j2 and βi j2 < βi j1 , or αi j1 < αi j2 and βi j2 > βi j1 . We can thus assume that for
each module mi, the list Li is sorted in increasing order on the values of α ji and in decreasing order on the values of
β ji . The following lemma shows that step 2 satisfies the privacy requirement of each module with high probability.
LEMMA 3 Let mi be any module in workflow W. Then with probability at least 1−2/n2, there exists a j ∈ [1, `i]
such that |Ihi | ≥ α ji and |Ohi | ≥ β ji .
Proof. Given a fractional solution to the LP relaxation, let p∈ [1, `i] be the index corresponding to the median (α ji ,β ji ),
satisfying ∑p−1j=1 ri j < 1/2 and ∑
p
j=1 ri j ≥ 1/2. We will show that after step 2, at least αip input data and βip output data
is hidden with probability at least 1−2/n2 for module mi.
We partition the set of data A into two sets: the set of data deterministically included in B, Bdet = {b : xb ≥
1/16logn}, and the set of data probabilistically rounded, Bprob = A \Bdet . Also, let Bround = B \Bdet be the set of
data that are actually hidden among Bprob. For each module mi, let Ideti = B
det ∩ Ii and Odeti = Bdet ∩Oi be the set of
hidden input and output data in Bdet respectively. Let the size of these sets be αdeti = |Ideti | and β deti = |Odeti |. Also, let
Iprobi = B
prob ∩ Ii and Oprobi = Bprob ∩Oi. Finally, let Iroundi = Bround ∩ Ii and Oroundi = Bround ∩Oi. We show that for
any module mi, |Iroundi | ≥ αip−αdeti and |Oroundi | ≥ βip−β deti with probability at least 1−1/n2.
First we show that ∑b∈Iprobi
xb ≥ (αim−αdeti )/2. Constraint (2) implies that ∑b∈Ii ybi j ≥ ri jα ji , while constraint (6)
ensures that ∑b∈Ideti ybi j ≤ ri jα
det
i . Combining these, we have
∑
b∈Iprobi
ybi j ≥ ri j(α ji −αdeti ). (12)
From constraint (4), we have
∑
b∈Iprobi
xb ≥ ∑
b∈Iprobi
`i
∑
j=1
ybi j ≥
`i
∑
j=p
∑
b∈Iprobi
ybi j.
Then, from Eqn. (12),
∑
b∈Iprobi
xb ≥
`i
∑
j=p
ri j(α ji −αdeti )≥ (αip−αdeti )
`i
∑
j=p
ri j.
Finally, using constraint (1), we conclude that
∑
b∈Iprobi
xb ≥ αip−α
det
i
2
. (13)
Similarly, since ∑pj=1 ri j ≥ 1/2 and the list Li is sorted in decreasing order of β ji , it follows that
∑
b∈Oprobi
xb ≥ βip−β
det
i
2
. (14)
Next we show that |Iroundi | ≥ αip−αdeti with probability ≥ 1− 1/n2. Each b ∈ Bprob is independently included in
Bround with probability 16xb logn. Hence, by Eqn. (13),
E[|Iroundi |] = ∑
b∈Iprobi
16xb logn≥ 8(αip−αdeti ) logn.
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Using Chernoff bound7, |Dround ∩ Ii| ≤ αip−αdeti with probability at most 1/n2. Similarly, using Eqn. (14), |Oroundi | ≤
βip−β deti with probability at most 1/n2. The lemma follows by using union bound over the failure probabilities.
We get the following corollary from Lemma 3, which proves the approximation result in Theorem 5.
Corollary 1. Algorithm 1 gives a feasible safe subset V with expected cost O(logn) times the optimal.
Proof. Using union bound over the set of n modules in the above lemma, we conclude that with probability at least
1−2/n, the solution produced by the rounding algorithm after step 2 is feasible. By linearity of expectation, the cost
of the rounded solution at this stage is at most 16 logn times that of the LP solution, and therefore O(logn) times that
of the optimal cost. If all modules are not satisfied after step 3, the cost of the data added to B in step 3 (by greedily
picking the best option Bmini for individual module) is at most O(n) times the optimal. However, this happens with
probability at most 2/n; thus the expected total cost of the final solution V produced by this algorithm remains O(logn)
times the optimal cost. Further, the solution V returned by the algorithm is always a safe subset.
B.4.2 Ω(logn)-Hardness
The following theorem shows that Algorithm 1 produces an optimal answer upto a constant factor and proves the
hardness result in Theorem 5.
We give a reduction from the minimum set cover problem to this version of the Secure-View problem where
`max = 1 and each data has unit cost. Since set cover is hard to approximate within a factor of o(logn) unless NP ⊆
DTIME(nO(log logn)) [14, 20], the hardness result of the Secure-View problem with cardinality constraints follows
under the same assumption.
An instance of the set cover problem consists of an input universe U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un}, and a set of its subsets
S= {S1,S2, . . . ,SM}, i.e. each Si ⊆U . The goal is to find a set of subsets T⊆ S of minimum size (i.e. |T| is minimized)
subject to the constraint that ∪Si∈TSi =U .
We create an instance of the Secure-View problem with workflow W , where W has a module mi corresponding
to each element ui ∈U , and an extra module z (in addition to the dummy source and sink modules s and t) We now
express the connections between modules in the workflow W . There is a single incoming edge ez from source module
s to z (for initial input data), a set of edges {ei j : Si 3 u j} from z to each f j (for intermediate data), and a single outgoing
edge e j from each f j (for final output data). to the sink node t. The edge ez uniquely carries data bs, and each edge e j
uniquely carries data b j for j ∈ [1,n]. All edges {ei j : j ∈ Si} carry the same data ai, i ∈ [1,M].
The privacy requirement for z is any single data ai carried by one of its outgoing edges, while that for each f j is
any single data ai carried by one of its incoming edges (i.e. Si 3 u j). In other words, Lz = {(0,1)}, L j = {(1,0)}.
Hence only the intermediate data, {ai : i ∈ [1,M]}, can be hidden; the cost of hiding each such data is 1. Note that the
maximum list size `max is 1 and the individual cadinality requirements are bounded by 1.
If the minimum set cover problem has a cover of size k, hiding the data corresponding to the subsets selected in the
cover produces a solution of cost k for this instance of the Secure-View problem. Conversely, if a solution to the
Secure-View problem hides a set of k data in {ai : i ∈ [1,M]}, selecting the corresponding sets produces a cover of
k sets. Hence the Secure-View problem with cardinality constraint is Ω(logn)-hard to approximate.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 6
We now consider the Secure-View problem with set constraints. Here the input requirement lists Li-s are given as
a list of pair of subsets of input and output attributes: Li = {(I ji ,O ji ) : j ∈ [1, `i], I ji ⊆ Ii,O ji ⊆ Oi}, for every i ∈ [1,n]
(see Section 4.2). The goal is find a safe subset V with minimum cost of hidden attributes c(V ) such that for every
i ∈ [1,n], V ⊇ (I ji ∪O ji ) for some j ∈ [1, `i].
Recall that `max denotes the maximum size of the requirement list of a module. Now we prove Theorem 6. First
we show that the Secure-View problem with set constraints is `εmax-hard to approximate, and then we give an
`max-approximation algorithm for this problem.
7If X is sum of independent boolean random variables with E[X ] = µ , then Pr[X ≤ µ(1− ε)]≤ e −µε
2
2 (see, for instance, [26]).
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B.5.1 `max-Approximation Algorithm
Here we give an `max-approximation algorithm for the Secure-View problem with set constraints as claimed in
Theorem 6. The algorithm rounds the solution given by LP relaxation of the following integer program:
Minimize ∑b∈A cbxb subject to
`i
∑
j=1
ri j ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ [1,n] (15)
xb ≥ ri j ∀b ∈ I ji ∪O ji , ∀i ∈ [1,n] (16)
xb,ri, j ∈ {0,1} (17)
The LP relaxation is obtained by changing Eqn. (17) to
xb,ri j ∈ [0,1]. (18)
The rounding algorithm includes all attributes b ∈ A such that xb ≥ 1/`max to the hidden attribute set V . The corre-
sponding visible attribute subset V is output as a solution.
Next we discuss the correctness and approximation ratio of the rounding algorithm. Since the maximum size of a
requirement list is `max, for each i, there exists a j = j(i) such that in the solution of the LP, ri j ≥ 1/`i ≥ 1/`max. Hence
there exists at least one j ∈ [1, `i] such that I ji ⊆V ,O ji ⊆V . Since c(V ) is most `max times the cost of LP solution, this
algorithm gives an `max-approximation.
B.5.2 `εmax-Hardness
The hardness result in Theorem 6 is obtained by a reduction from the minimum label cover problem [5]. An instance of
the minimum label cover problem consists of a bipartite graph H = (U,U ′,EH), a label set L, and a non-empty relation
Ruw ⊆ L×L for each edge (u,w) ∈ EH . A feasible solution is a label assignment to the vertices, A : U ∪U ′→ 2L, such
that for each edge (u,w), there exist `1 ∈ A(u), `2 ∈ A(w) such that (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw. The objective is to find a feasible
solution that minimizes ∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)|.
Unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog n), the label cover problem is |L|ε -hard to approximate for some constant ε >
0 [5, 29]. The instance of the Secure-View problem in the reduction will have `max = |L|2. Theorem 6 follows
immediately.
Given an instance of the label cover problem as defined above, we create an instance of the Secure-View prob-
lem by constructing a workflow W (refer to Figure 4). For each edge (u,w) ∈ EH , there is a module xuw in W . In
addition, W has another module z.
As shown in Figure 4, the input and output attributes of the modules are as follows: (i) z has a single incoming
edge with the initial input data item bz, (ii) z has (|U |+ |U ′|)×L output attributes bu,`, for every u ∈U ∪U ′ and every
` ∈ L. Every such attribute bu,` is sent to all xuw where (u,w) ∈ EH (see Figure 4). Hence every xuw has 2L input
attributes: {bu,` : ` ∈ L} ⋃{bw,`′ : `′ ∈ L}. (iii) there is a single outgoing edge from each xuw carrying data item
buw (final output data). The cost of hiding any data is 1. The requirement list of z contains singleton subsets of each
intermediate data bu,`, i.e., Lz = {(φ ,{bu,`}) : u ∈U ∪U ′, ` ∈ L}. The list of xuw, for each (u,w) ∈ E, contains pairs of
data corresponding to the members of the relation Ruw, i.e Luw = {(φ ,{bu,`1 ,bw,`2}) : (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw}.
The following lemma proves the correctness of the reduction.
Lemma 5. The label cover instance H has a solution of cost K iff the Secure-View instance W has a solution of
cost K.
Proof. Let A : U ∪U ′ → 2L be a solution of the label cover instance H with total cost K = ∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)|. We
create a solution V for the Secure-View instance W as follows: for each u ∈U ∪U ′, and ` ∈ L, add bu,` to hidden
attributes V iff ` ∈ A(u). We claim that V is a feasible solution for G. For each u ∈ U ∪U ′, A(u) is non-empty;
hence, the requirement of z is trivially satisfied. Since A is a valid label cover solution, for each (u,w) ∈ EH , there
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Figure 4: Reduction from label cover: bold edges correspond to (p,q) ∈ Ruw, dotted edges are for data sharing.
exists `1 ∈ A(u) and `2 ∈ A(w) such that (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw. Hence for the same pair (`1, `2), (bu,`1 ,bw,`2) ∈ Lxuw , and both
bu,`1 ,bw,`2 ∈V . This satisfies the requirement for all modules xuw in W .
Conversely, let V be a solution of the Secure-View instance W , where |V | = K. Note that V can include only
the intermediate data. For each u ∈U ∪U ′, we define A(u) = {`|bu,` ∈ V}. Clearly, ∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)| = K. For each
xuw ∈V , the requirement of xuw is satisfied by V ; hence there exist `1, `2 ∈ L such that bu,`1 ,bw,`2 ∈V . This implies that
for each edge (u,w) ∈ EH , there exist `1 ∈ A(u) and `2 ∈ A(w), where (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw, thereby proving feasibility.
Remark. If N = |U |+ |U ′|, the label cover problem is also known to be Ω(2log1−γ N)-hard to approximate for all
constant γ > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog n) [5, 29]. Thus, the Secure-View problem with set constraints is
Ω(2log1−γ n)-hard to approximate as well, for all constant γ > 0, under the same complexity assumption.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 7
The Secure-View problem becomes substantially easier to approximate if the workflow has bounded data sharing,
i.e. when every data d produced by some module is either a final output data or is an input data to at most γ other
modules. Though the problem remains NP-hard even with this restriction, Theorem 7 shows that it is possible to
approximate it within a constant factor when γ is a constant.
First, we give a (γ + 1)-approximation algorithm for the Secure-View problem with set constraints, where each
data is shared by at most γ edges. This also implies an identical approximation factor for the cardinality version.
Then, we show that the cardinality version of the problem is APX-hard, i.e. there exists a constant c> 1 such that it is
NP-hard to obtain a c-approximate solution to the problem. The set version is therefore APX-hard as well.
B.6.1 (γ+1)-Approximation Algorithm
Recall that the input to the problem includes a requirement list Li = {(I ji ,O ji ) : j ∈ [1, `i], I ji ⊆ Ii,O ji ⊆ Oi} for each
module vi. Let (I
j∗
i ,O
j∗
i ) be a minimum cost pair for module vi, i.e. c(I
j∗
i ∪O j∗i ) = min`ij=1 c(I
j
i ∪O ji ). The algorithm
greedily chooses I j∗i ∪O j∗i for each module vi, i.e. the set of hidden data V =
⋃
1≤i≤n(I
j∗
i ∪O j∗i ).
Note that each intermediate data is an input to at most γ modules. In any optimal solution, assume that each
terminal module of every hidden edge carrying this data pays its cost. Then, the total cost paid by the modules is at
most γ+1 times the cost of the optimal solution. On the other hand, the total cost paid by any module is at least the
cost of the edges incident on the module that are hidden by the algorithm. Thus, the solution of the algorithm has cost
at most γ+1 times the optimal cost.
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A very similar greedy algorithm with the same approximation factor can be given to the Secure-View problem
with cardinality constraints.
B.6.2 APX-Hardness
We give a reduction from the minimum vertex cover problem in cubic graphs to the Secure-View problem with
cardinality constraints. An instance of the vertex cover problem consists of an undirected graph G′(V ′,E ′). The goal
is to find a subset of vertices S⊆V ′ of minimum size |S| such that each edge e ∈ E ′ has at least one endpoint in S.
Given an instance of the vertex cover problem, we create an instance of the Secure-View problem W (see
Figure 5). For each edge (u,v) ∈ E ′, there is a module xuv in W ; also there is a module yv for each vertex v ∈ V ′. In
addition to these, W contains a single module z.
Next we define the edges in the workflow W ; since there is no data sharing, each edge corresponds to a unique data
item and cost of hiding each edge is 1. For each xuv, there is a single incoming edge (carrying initial input data) and
two outgoing edges (xuv,yu) and (xuv,yv). There is an outgoing edge (yv,z) from every yv (carrying final output data).
Finally, there is an outgoing edge from z for final output data item.
xuv
yvyu
z
Figure 5: Reduction from vertex cover, the dark edges show a solution with cost |E ′|+K, K = size of a vertex cover
in G′
Now we define the requirement list for each module in W . For each xuv, Luv = {(0,1)}, i.e. the requirement for
xuv is any single outgoing edge. For each yv, Lv = {(dv,0),(0,1)}, where dv is the degree of the v in G′. Hence the
requirement of the vertex yv is either all of its incoming edges, or a single outgoing edge. For vertex z, Lz = {(1,0)},
i.e. hiding any incoming edge suffices.
Lemma 6. The vertex cover instance G′ has a solution of size K if and only if the Secure-View instance W has a
solution of cost m′+K, where m′ = |E ′| is the number of edges in G′.
Proof. Let S⊆V ′ be a vertex cover of G′ of size K. We create a create a set of hidden edges V for the Secure-View prob-
lem as follows: for each v∈ S, add (yv,z) to V . Further, for each xuv, if u /∈ S, add (xuv,yu) to V , otherwise add (xuv,yv).
For this choice of V , we claim that V is safe set of attributes for W .
Clearly, the requirement is satisfied for each xuv, since one outgoing edge is hidden; the same holds for all yv such
that v ∈ S. Assuming E ′ to be non-empty, any vertex cover is of size at least one. Hence at least one incoming edge
to z is hidden. Finally, for every yv such that v /∈ S, all its incoming edges are hidden; if not, S is not a vertex cover.
Hence V satisfies the requirement of all modules in W . Since we hide exactly one outgoing edge from all xuv, and
exactly one outgoing edge from all yv where v ∈ S, the cost of the solution is m′+K.
Now assume that we have a solution V ⊆ A of the Secure-View instance with cost |V | = K′. We can assume,
wlog, that for each xuv exactly one outgoing edge is included in V ; if both (xuv,yu) and (xuv,yv) are in V , we arbitrarily
select one of u or v, say u, and replace the edge (xuv,yu) in V with the edge (yu,z) to get another feasible solution
without increasing the cost. We claim that the set S ⊆ V ′ of vertices v such that (yv,z) ∈ V forms a vertex cover. For
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any edge (u,v) ∈ E ′, if (xuv,yu) /∈V , then (yu,z) ∈V to satisfy the requirement of yu, and therefore u ∈ S; otherwise,
v ∈ S by the same argument. Hence S is a vertex cover. Since each vertex xuv has exactly one outgoing edge in V ,
|S|= K′−m′.
To complete the proof, note that if G′ were a cubic graph, i.e. the degree of each vertex is at most 3, then the
size of any vertex cover K ≥ m′/3. It is known that vertex cover in cubic graphs is APX-hard [4]; hence so is the
Secure-View problem with cardinality constraints and no data sharing. An exactly identical reduction shows that
the Secure-View problem with set constraints and no data sharing is APX-hard as well.
C Proofs from Section 5
C.1 Proof of Lemma 7
In this section we state and prove Lemma 7, which uses the same notations as in Lemma 1. Here again mi is a fixed
private module.
Lemma 7. If m j, j ∈ [K+1,n] is a public module such that m j 6= g j in the proof of Lemma 1, then (I j ∪O j)∩Vi 6= φ ,
and therefore m j will be hidden.
Proof. We will show that if (I j ∪O j)∩Vi = φ , then m j = g j.
Recall that we defined two tuples p,q over attributes Ii ∪Oi in the proof of Lemma 1 and argued that p[a] = q[a]
for all the attributes a ∈ (Ii∪Oi)∩Vi. Hence if p[a] 6= q[a], then a ∈Vi, i.e. a is hidden. From the definition of FLIP it
follows that, when (I j∪O j)∩Vi = φ , for an input u to m j FLIPp,q(u) = u. Similarly, FLIPp,q(v) = v, where v=m j(u).
Hence for any input u to m j,
g j(u) = FLIPm j ,p,q(u)
= FLIPp,q(m j(FLIPp,q(u)))
= FLIPp,q(m j(u))
= FLIPp,q(v)
= v
= m j(u).
Since this is true for all input u to m j, m j = g j holds.
C.2 Bounded Data Sharing
In Section B.6 we showed that the Secure-View problem with cardinality or set constraints has a γ+1-approximation
where every data item in A can be fed as input to at most γ modules. This implies that without any data sharing (when
γ = 1), Secure-View with cardinality or set constraints had a 2-approximation. In the following theorem we show
that in arbitrary networks, this problem is Ω(logn)-hard to approximate.
Theorem 9. Bounded Data sharing (general workflows): Unless NP⊆DTIME(nO(log logn)), the Secure-View prob-
lem with cardinality constraints without data sharing in general workflows is Ω(logn)-hard to approximate even if the
maximum size of the requirement lists is 1 and the individual requirements are bounded by 1.
Proof. The reduction will again be from the set cover problem. An instance of the set cover problem consists of an
input universe U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un′}, and a set of its subsets S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sm′}, i.e. each Si ⊆U . The goal is to find
a set of subsets T⊆ S of minimum size (i.e. |T| is minimized) subject to the constraint that ∪Si∈TSi = U.
Given an instance of the set-cover problem, we construct a workflow W as follow: (i) we create a public module
for every element in U , (ii) we create a private module for every set in S, (iii) we add an edge (Si,u j) with data item bi j
if and only if u j ∈ Si. Every set Si has an incoming edge with data item ai (initial input data) and every element u j has
an outgoing edge with data item b j (final output data). The cost of hiding every edge is 0 and the cost of privatizing
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every set node Si is 1. The requirement list of every private module u j is L j = {(1,0)}, i.e., for every such module one
of the incoming edges must be chosen.
It is easy to verify that the set cover has a solution of size K if and only if the Secure-View problem has
a solution of cost K. Since set-cover is known to be Ω(logn′)-hard to approximate, m′ is polynomial in n′ in the
construction in [20], and the total number of nodes in W , n = O(n′+m′), this problem has the same hardness of
approximation as set cover, i.e. the problem is Ω(logn)-hard to approximate.
C.3 Cardinality Constraints
Here we show that the Secure-View problem with cardinality constraints is Ω(2log1−γ n)-hard to approximate. This
is in contrast with the O(logn)-approximation obtained for this problem in all-private workflows (see Theorem 5).
Theorem 10. Cardinality Constraints (general workflows): Unless NP⊆DTIME(npolylog n), the Secure-View prob-
lem with cardinality constraints in general workflows is Ω(2log1−γ n)-hard to approximate for all constant γ > 0 even
if the maximum size of the requirement lists is 1 and the individual requirements are bounded by 1.
The hardness result in Theorem 10 is obtained by a reduction from the minimum label cover problem [5]. An
instance of the minimum label cover problem consists of a bipartite graph H = (U,U ′,EH), a label set L, and a non-
empty relation Ruw ⊆ L× L for each edge (u,w) ∈ EH . A feasible solution is a label assignment to the vertices,
A : U ∪U ′→ 2L, such that for each edge (u,w), there exist `1 ∈ A(u), `2 ∈ A(w) such that (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw. The objective
is to find a feasible solution that minimizes ∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)|. If N = |U |+ |U ′|, the label cover problem is known to be
|L|ε -hard to approximate for some constant ε > 0, as well as, Ω(2log1−γ N)-hard to approximate for all constant γ > 0,
unless NP⊆ DTIME(npolylog n) [5, 29].
Given an instance of the label cover problem as defined above, we create an instance of the Secure-View prob-
lem by constructing a workflow W (refer to Figure 6). We will show that the label cover instance H has a solution of
cost K if and only if the Secure-View instance W has a solution with the same cost K. Further, in our reduction,
the number of modules n in the workflow W will be O(N2). Hence the Secure-View problem with cardinality con-
straints in general workflows will beΩ(2log1−γ n)-hard to approximate for all constant γ > 0 under the same complexity
assumption which proves Theorem 10.
v
yp, q
dv
xu, wzw, qzu, p
du, w, p, q 
Figure 6: Reduction from label cover: (p,q) ∈ Ruw, the public modules are darken, all public modules have unit cost,
all data have zero cost, the names of the data never hidden are omitted for simplicity
Construction First we describe the modules in W . For each edge (u,w) ∈ EH , there is a private module xu,w in W .
For every pair of labels (`1, `2), there is a private module y`1,`2 . There are public module zu,` for every u∈U∪U ′, `∈ L.
In addition, W has another private module v.
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As shown in Figure 6, there are the following types of edges and data items in W : (i) an incoming single edge to v
carrying initial input data item ds, c(ds) = 0, (ii) an edge from v to every node y`1,`2 , each such edge carries the same
data dv produced by v, c(dv) = 0, (iii) for every (u,w) ∈ EH , for (`1, `2) ∈ Ru,w, there is an edge from y`1,`2 to xu,w
carrying data du,w,`1,`2 , and c(du,w,`1,`2) = 0, (iv) further, every such data du,w,`1,`2 produced by y`1,`2 is also fed to both
zu,`1 and zv,`2 . (v) All y`1,`2 and all zu,` have an outgoing edge carrying data (final output data items) d`1,`2 and du,`1
respectively; c(d`1,`2) = 0 and c(du,`1) = 0.
Privacy requirement of v is {(0,1)}, i.e., v has to always choose the output data dv to satisfy its requirement. Privacy
requirement of every y`1,`2 is {(1,0)}, i.e. choosing dv satisfies the requirement for all such y`1,`2 -s. Requirements of
every xu,w is (1,0), so one of the data items du,w,`1,`2 , (`1, `2) ∈ Ru,w must be chosen.
All modules except zu,`-s are private. Cost of privatizing zu,`, c(zu,`) = 1. In the above reduction, all data items
have cost 0 and the cost of a solution entirely comes from privatizing the public modules zu,`-s.
In this reduction, maximum list size and maximum magnitude of any cardinality requirement are both bounded by
1. In the label cover instance it is known that number of labels L ≤ number of vertices N, therefore the total number
of modules in W = O(L2+LN+N2) = O(N2). The following lemma proves the correctness of the reduction.
Lemma 8. The label cover instance H has a solution of cost K iff the Secure-View instance W has a solution of
cost K.
Proof. Let A : U ∪U ′→ 2L be a solution of the label cover instance H with total cost K =∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)|. We create a
solution V for the Secure-View instance W as follows: First, add dv to the hidden attribute subset V . This satisfies
the requirement of v and all y`1,`2 without privatizing any public modules. So we need to satisfy the requirements of
xu,w.
Since A is a valid label cover solution, for every edge (u,w) ∈ E, there is a label pair (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw such that
`1 ∈ A(u) and `2 ∈ A(w). For every xu,w, add such du,w,`1,`2 to V . For each u ∈ U ∪U ′, and ` ∈ L, add zu,` to the
privatized public modules P. iff ` ∈ A(u). It is easy to check that (V,P) is safe for W . If du,w,`1,`2 is hidden, both zu,`1
and zv,`2 are added to P. Since c(V ) = 0, cost of the solution is c(P) = K = ∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)|.
Conversely, let (V,P) be a safe solution of the Secure-View instance W , where K = c(P). For each u ∈U ∪U ′,
we define A(u) = {`|zu,` ∈ P}. Clearly, ∑u∈U∪U ′ |A(u)| = K. For each (u,w) ∈ E, the requirement of xu,w is satisfied
by V ; hence there exist `1, `2 ∈ L such that du,w,`1,`2 ∈ V . Therefore both zu,`1 ,zw,`2 ∈ P. This implies that for each
edge (u,w) ∈ EH , there exist `1 ∈ A(u) and `2 ∈ A(w), where (`1, `2) ∈ Ruw, thereby proving feasibility.
C.4 Set-Constraints
We modify the LP given in Section B.5 and give an `max-approximation algorithm for the set-constraints version in
general workflows. As before, for an attribute b ∈ A, xb = 1 if and only if b is hidden (in the final solution b ∈V ). In
addition, for a public module mi, i ∈ [K + 1,n], wi = 1 if and only if mi is hidden (in the final solution mi ∈ P). The
algorithm rounds the solution given by LP relaxation of the following integer program. The new condition introduced
is (21), which says that, if any input or output attribute of a public module mi is included in V , mi must be hidden.
Further, (19) is needed only for the private modules (mi such that i ∈ [1,K]). For simplicity we denote c(b) = cb and
c(mi) = ci.
Minimize ∑b∈A cbxb+∑i∈[K+1,n] ciwi subject to
`i
∑
j=1
ri j ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ [1,K] (19)
xb ≥ ri j ∀b ∈ Ii j ∪Oi j, ∀i ∈ [1,K] (20)
wi ≥ xb ∀b ∈ Ii∪Oi, ∀i ∈ [K+1,n] (21)
xb,ri, j,wi ∈ {0,1} (22)
The LP relaxation is obtained by changing Constraint (22) to
xb,ri j,wi ∈ [0,1]. (23)
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The rounding algorithm outputs V = {b : xb ≥ 1/`max} and P = {mi : b ∈V for some b ∈ Ii∪Oi}.
Since the maximum size of a requirement list is `max =maxni=1 `i, for each i, there exists a j such that in the solution
of the LP, ri j ≥ 1/`i ≥ 1/`max (from (19)). Hence there exists at least one j ∈ [1, `i] such that Ii j ∪Oi j ⊆V . Further, a
public module mi, i ∈ [K+1,n] is hidden (i.e. included to V ) only if there is an attribute b ∈ Ii∪Oi which is included
to V . Therefore from (21), for all mi ∈ P, wi ≥ 1`max . Since both c(V ) and c(P) are most `max times the cost of the
respective cost in the LP solution, this rounding algorithm gives an `max-approximation.
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